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I. Introduction 
With the increase of globalization and international business 
transactions, forum selection clauses have never played a more 
important role in cross-border litigation than they do today.  Often 
mistaken as simply boilerplate provisions in a contract, forum 
selection clauses—or jurisdiction clauses,1 as they are often called 
in civil law countries—can be the clincher in cross-border disputes.  
Such clauses, whether directly or indirectly, can, for example, 
determine whether a party to an international contract will have to 
spend millions of dollars litigating a dispute in a foreign country.  
They can also determine whether a party will be entitled to certain 
types of damages which may be permissible in one country and 
precluded in another, or whether a party’s claim will be heard at all 
in situations where one country may allow claims that another does 
not or where a claim is precluded by a statute of limitations in one 
country but not in another. 
When a court is met with a forum selection clause, the 
discussion generally focuses on two issues: (1) whether the clause 
is enforceable and (2) how the clause should be interpreted.  The 
issues of enforceability and interpretation are often interrelated.  For 
example, what a court interprets a forum selection clause to actually 
mean can determine whether or not the court will ultimately enforce 
the clause.  Historically, courts in some countries may have been 
hesitant to enforce forum selection clauses.  Today, however, there 
is a consensus among many countries that the intent of the parties 
to an agreement should be upheld wherever possible and, to that 
end, forum selection clauses should by default be enforced.  As a 
result, a court’s analysis of a forum selection clause is generally 
structured to answer the question: why should the clause not be 
 
 1 The term “forum selection clause” and “jurisdiction clause” will be used 
interchangeably throughout this paper; however, where possible, reference will be made 
to the term used in the relevant jurisdiction or court. 
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enforced?  However, the doctrines and tests that each court applies 
to determine when such clauses should not be enforced differ across 
national borders. 
To answer this question of why a forum selection clause should 
not be enforced, courts inevitably—whether they realize or 
acknowledge it or not—are required to engage in some sort of 
interpretation of the clause.  By way of example, a court could be 
met with the following jurisdiction clause: “The parties agree that 
all proceedings arising out of or in connection with any dispute 
concerning this Agreement . . . shall only be . . . determined by a 
court of competent jurisdiction in British Columbia.”2  In deciding 
whether to enforce this clause, a court may first have to decide, per 
the wording of the clause, whether the forum chosen by the parties 
is the exclusive forum for disputes arising out of the agreement.3   
Separately, a court may also have to decide whether the dispute 
before it “arises out of” or is “in connection with” the agreement 
and thereby fits into the scope of the clause.  Further, if one of the 
parties to the dispute was not a party to the agreement, a court may 
have to decide whether that party can seek to enforce the clause or, 
in other words, whether the clause applies to third parties.4 
For the most part, these three interpretive questions are 
questions of law for a court, as opposed to questions of fact.5  Given 
 
 2 Civil Ag Grp., Inc. v. Octaform Sys., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1114 (D. Minn.  
2017) (example forum selection clause). 
 3 An alternative to a forum selection clause being exclusive is that the parties simply 
consented to jurisdiction in the forum mentioned in the clause while not excluding the 
possibility of other forums. 
 4 As evident by the case examples provided in this paper, these three interpretive 
issues are the main issues courts are concerned with when interpreting the meaning of a 
forum selection clause.  While these three issues are the main issues, they certainly are not 
the only issues.  Another issue that commonly arises (particularly in the United States) is 
whether a forum selection clause requires parties to litigate in a state or provincial court 
versus federal court.  For example, the sample clause discussed from the case Civil Ag 
Grp., Inc. v. Octaform Sys., Inc. simply states “a court of competent jurisdiction is British 
Columbia.”  As a result, it is not clear whether the clause requires the parties to litigate in 
the Provincial Court of British Columbia or in a federal court such as the Canada Federal 
Court in Vancouver.  Arguably, for the purpose of forum shopping, it is not uncommon 
for parties to try to argue that a clause, taken together with other aspects of the agreement 
and the relationship between the parties, requires disputes to be litigated in federal courts 
rather than state courts, or vice versa. 
 5 It is certainly possible that in some cases these interpretive issues will be questions 
of fact for a court and the court will be required to look at previous discussions between 
the parties or other components of the relationship between the parties to determine what 
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the court must apply law to answer such interpretive questions, an 
issue that can arise before the court is what law should be applied to 
answer these interpretive questions.  More specifically, in 
interpreting forum selection clauses, should the court apply the law 
of the jurisdiction in which it sits (the law of the forum) or apply the 
law chosen by the parties to govern their agreement?  How courts 
in different countries approach this narrow question—or whether 
courts in such countries address the issue at all—is the focal point 
of this paper. 
This paper outlines how the law and courts in many of the major 
English- and German-speaking nations interpret forum selection 
clauses.  The countries surveyed include Germany, Austria, the 
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, and the United 
States.  A survey of these countries demonstrates differences 
between civil law and common law jurisdictions, countries that are 
Member States of the European Union and countries that are not in 
the European Union, and between countries that have complex 
codified rules on conflict of laws and countries that rely solely on 
case law doctrine.  The paper is structured to first summarize how 
the law and courts of each country handle the interpretation of 
forum selection clauses, beginning with an outline of any relevant 
legislation or governing case law.  It then provides a series of case 
examples.6  The case examples demonstrate what can be thought of 
as three levels of analysis a court can engage in when interpreting a 
forum selection clause: (1) the enforceability of the clause; (2) 
 
the intent of the parties actually was.  However, it is more often the case that parties have 
included what is known as a merger clause (also referred to as an integration clause or 
entire agreement clause), which declares the written contract to be the final and complete 
agreement between the parties, and ideally precludes a court from considering extrinsic 
evidence to determine the intent of the parties.  Common law courts may also follow what 
is known as the parol evidence rule, which effectuates the purpose of a merger clause and 
prevents the court from looking outside the agreement.  For more on the basics of merger 
clauses, see generally ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.8 
(2015). 
 6 While the paper will focus on the interpretation of forum selection clauses, the 
relevancy of the previously discussed enforceability issues will be apparent in 
interpretation analyses and will consequently be interwoven throughout the paper.  In fact, 
as the case examples will show, many courts simply blur the issues of enforceability and 
interpretation of forum selection clauses together into one overall analysis.  For more on 
the enforceability of forum selection clauses, see generally Matthew J. Sorensen, 
Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court After Atlantic Marine, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2521 (2014).   
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which law governs interpretation of the clause; and (3) actual 
interpretation of the clause.  The case examples show that some 
courts dip into all three levels of analysis in their discussion of a 
forum selection clause, while other courts limit their analysis to 
enforceability issues.  As a result, the courts that adopt the latter 
approach do not actually interpret the forum selection clause at all.  
In fact, the question of what law applies to the interpretation of a 
forum selection clause is an issue that can simply be ignored by 
some courts, or, alternatively, acknowledged but passed over so the 
court can reach its desired outcome.  The paper concludes with a 
number of survey observations, including a list of factors which, 
based on the survey results, may be included in a nation’s approach 
to the interpretation of forum selection clauses. 
II.  The European Union  
As a supranational organization consisting of 28 Member States 
with 24 different languages, the government of the European Union 
is, for obvious reasons, familiar with cross-border litigation issues.  
Among these issues are forum selection clauses—often referred to 
as jurisdiction clauses in European jurisdictions—and the role that 
such clauses play in international litigation.   
To summarize the law in any country that is a member of the 
European Union, it is first essential to consider EU law.  The 
authority of the European Union as an organization and the 
authority of its individual institutions derives from two main 
treaties: the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)7 and the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).8  Under these 
treaties, two EU institutions, the Council and the European 
Parliament, have authority to, among other things, exercise 
legislative functions for the European Union.9  Legislation is 
primarily adopted through two types of acts in the European Union: 
regulations and directives.10  Regulations have general application 
 
 7 See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2016 O.J. 
(C 202) 1 [hereinafter TEU]. 
 8 See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 1 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 9 TEU, supra note 7, art. 16; TFEU, supra note 8, art. 289. 
 10 See generally KAREN DAVIES, UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION LAW, ch. 4 (5th 
ed.  2013) (explaining that the European Union issues other legal acts, called secondary 
legislation, including decisions, recommendations, and opinions). 
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and are binding and directly applicable to EU Member States, which 
gives them direct and immediate force in the laws of the Member 
States.11  Directives are also binding “as to the result to be 
achieved[,]” but they must be transposed into the national law of the 
EU member states by the governments of the Member States.  The 
Member States retain authority over the form and methods of the 
legislation, but the law must facilitate the result the directive aimed 
to achieve.12 
The EU institutions also have the authority to conclude 
international agreements on behalf of the Member States.13  While 
the authority of the European Union is limited in terms of what 
exactly the supranational organization can adopt legislation on, that 
authority is relatively broad in that it includes all matters within the 
scope of the objectives of the European Union, which are listed and 
discussed in depth in the TEU and TFEU.  Essentially, under this 
authority provided to the European Union by the treaties, EU law 
has a two-fold effect on law in EU Member States through 
mechanisms known as positive and negative integration.14  Positive 
integration refers to the ability of the European Union to adopt 
measures that establish common standards throughout the European 
Union.15  Negative integration allows the European Union to 
suppress national law of any Member State that violates the 
common standards adopted by the European Union.16 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the European Union has developed 
considerable legislation concerning the area known as private 
international law (commonly referred to as “conflict of laws” in 
common law countries).  This legislation includes rules related to 
how courts in EU Member States are required to address disputes 
between parties when the parties have agreed to a forum selection 
and/or choice-of-law clause.  This section will describe the main 
pieces of legislation that guide such issues under EU law, in addition 
 
 11 TFEU, supra note 8, art. 288. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at art. 216. 
 14 See Jan-Jaap Kuipers, European Union and Private International Law, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017).  The 
terms positive integration and negative integration are also sometimes referred to as 
positive harmonization and negative harmonization, respectively. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
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to the current state of relevant law in three sovereign states in the 
European Union: Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom. 
A. The Basics on EU Private International Law 
In the European Union and in many civil law countries, the 
enforcement and interpretation of a forum selection clause falls 
under the general field known as private  
international law.  The European Union has established a network 
of rules regarding private international law through a number of 
regulations, which are typically binding on all EU Member States.17  
This section will summarize and outline the most relevant 
regulations in the current EU framework on private international 
law: The Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I Regulation.18   
1. The Brussels I Regulation 
EU law governing private international law issues regarding 
jurisdiction clauses is primarily regulated by what is known as the 
“Brussels Regime.”19  The current regulation underlying the 
 
 17 EU regulations are not always binding on all member states due to special 
arrangements that certain member states, such as Denmark, have with the European Union.  
However, despite not being required to do so, these countries often also adopt EU 
regulations. 
 18 The European Union has issued many other regulations and protocols that address 
more specific private international law issues including, for example, the Brussels II 
Regulation and the Rome II and Rome III Regulations, which govern issues related to the 
forum and law applicable to non-contractual obligations and to divorce and legal 
separation, respectively.  There are also regulations, Brussels IV and Rome IV, which 
govern private international law as it relates to succession.  Depending on the type of 
agreement and the law chosen by the parties, these regulations may also be helpful for 
understanding the scope of a forum selection clause if the law chosen by the parties is the 
law of an E.U. Member State.  However, this paper has limited the discussion of EU private 
international law regulations to the Brussels I Regulation and Rome I Regulation, which 
will govern forum selection clauses in the majority of international business contracts, like 
the type of contracts at issue in many of the cases discussed here. 
 19 The term “Brussels Regime” historically may refer to the predecessors of the 
current regulation including Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, which was previously called the “Brussels I Regulation.”  It may also refer to the 
Brussels convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, which is commonly referred to as the “Brussels 
Convention.”  For a more detailed discussion of the historical development of private 
international law in the European Union, see Burkhard Hess & Vincent Richard, Brussels 
I (Convention and Regulation), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017). 
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Brussels Regime is the re-casted Brussels I Regulation.20  One of 
the most important functions of the regulation is to lay out the basic 
private international law rules for EU Member States on 
jurisdiction.21  Such rules are divided between general and special 
jurisdiction rules, and further divided into separate sections for 
certain areas of law including insurance, consumer contracts, 
employment contracts, and special matters that require exclusive 
jurisdiction rules such as matters in rem.22   
Under Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation, jurisdiction 
clauses selecting an EU Member State are generally to be upheld by 
other EU Member States unless the agreement between the parties 
regarding jurisdiction is “null and void as to its substantive validity 
under the law of that Member State.”23  Further clarification of the 
wording from Article 25 is provided in the recitals to the 
 
 20 Parliament and Council Regulation 1215/2012, On Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast), 
2012 O.J. (L 351/1) [hereinafter Recast Brussels I Regulation].  This regulation may be 
referred to as the “Recast Brussels I Regulation,” the “Brussels I Regulation,” or even 
“Brussels IA Regulation.”   It is commonly referred to as the “EuGVVO” or “EuGVO” or 
“EuGVÜ” in German-speaking countries.  The same term can be applied to refer to all of 
the Brussels regulations.  This paper will refer to this current version of the regulation in 
text as the “Brussels I Regulation.”  The regulation was adopted in 2012, entered into force 
on 10 January, 2015, and is now binding on all Member States of the European Union.  At 
its inception, the regulation was not binding on Denmark, which opted out of the regulation 
on 20 December, 2012.  However, Denmark later implemented the regulation as it applies 
to relations between the European Union and Denmark by Danish Law No. 518 of 18 May 
2012, which entered into force on 1 June, 2013.  See European Commission, National 
Information and Online Forms Concerning Regulation No. 1215/2012, EUROPEAN E-
JUSTICE (Nov. 20, 2017), https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_brussels_i_regulation_recast-
350-en.do [https://perma.cc/CA7C-7MGG]. 
 21 As indicated by the title, the regulation also provides rules on the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements, which will not be discussed in this paper. 
 22 The conflict of law rules included in the Brussels I Regulation constitute the 
majority of the jurisdiction-related parts of the Regulation.  The general jurisdiction 
provisions are provided for in Articles 4–6.  Special jurisdiction rules are provided for in 
Articles 7–9.  Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance is discussed in Articles 10–16.   
Consumer contracts are discussed in Articles 17–19.  Employment contracts are discussed 
in Articles 20–23.  Finally, special matters for which exclusive jurisdiction is provided for 
under the Regulation are discussed in Article 24.   
 23 Recast Brussels I Regulation, supra note 20, at art. 25(1) (“If the parties, regardless 
of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have 
jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with 
a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction unless the 
agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member 
State.”). 
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Regulation.24  Recital 20 of the Regulation states: 
 
Where a question arises as to whether a choice-of-court agreement in 
favour of a court or the courts of a Member State is null and void as to 
its substantive validity, that question should be decided in accordance 
with the law of the Member State of the court or courts designated in the 
agreement, including the conflict-of-laws rules of that Member State.25 
 
In addition to this general preference for enforcement, the 
Regulation states that forum selection clauses “shall be treated as an 
agreement independent of the other terms of the contract” and that 
the validity of a jurisdiction clause “cannot be contested solely on 
the ground that the contract is not valid.”26  Article 25(1) also 
provides for a presumption of exclusivity for such clauses by stating 
that the jurisdiction under a jurisdiction clause “shall be exclusive 
unless the parties have agreed otherwise.”27 
In addition, the Brussels I Regulation also contains provisions 
which govern how courts of EU Member States should procedurally 
handle disputes to avoid parallel proceedings being held in multiple 
jurisdictions.28  The Brussels I Regulation also introduced lis 
pendens, or “pending litigation” rules.  These rules give preference 
to the court of an EU Member State which was the “court first 
seised” by requiring any other EU Member State court to stay any 
action before it until the first court establishes whether or not it has 
jurisdiction.29  With specific regard to jurisdiction clauses, Article 
31(2) allows a court of a Member State which is not in the forum 
 
 24 It should be noted that recitals and preambles in E.U. instruments and legislation 
have no binding or autonomous effect. Recitals operate as “interpretive tools” in EU 
legislation, meaning they can help to explain the purpose and intent behind the legislation. 
They are considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU” or “ECJ”) in 
a limited capacity, often only being taken into account to resolve ambiguities in the 
legislation. See Case C-162/97, Nilsson & Others, 1998 E.C.R. I-7477, ¶ 54; see also 
Roberto Baratta, Complexity of EU Law in the Domestic Implementing Process, 2 THEORY 
& Prac. Legis. 293 (2014). 
 25 Recast Brussels I Regulation, supra note 20, at recital 20. 
 26 Id. at art. 25(4–5). 
 27 Id. at art. 25(1). 
 28 Id. at art. 8, 9.  For example, if one Member State has exclusive jurisdiction under 
Article 24 of the Regulation, Article 27 requires a court in any other Member State to 
declare by its own motion that it has no jurisdiction over the claim.  Id. art. 24, 27. 
 29 Id. at art. 29(1). 
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chosen by the parties in their jurisdiction clause to stay any 
proceedings brought before it if proceedings are also brought before 
the court which was conferred exclusive jurisdiction under the 
jurisdiction clause “until such time as the court seised on the basis 
of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the 
agreement.”30  However, while the lis pendens rules allow the court 
to stay such proceedings based on the jurisdiction clause, it does not 
require the court to do so. 
2. The Rome I Regulation 
The second regulation that makes up the core of EU private 
international law rules relevant to this paper is the Rome I 
Regulation.31  While the Brussels I Regulation, among other things, 
discusses the enforcement of jurisdiction clauses and related issues, 
the Rome I Regulation governs choice-of-law issues in the 
European Union.  The Regulation discusses the effect of contractual 
choice-of-law clauses and establishes default rules in the absence of 
a choice-of-law agreement.  Article 3(1) of the regulation generally 
states, “[a] contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the 
parties.”32  Article 12 of the Regulation governs the scope of the 
applicable law and notably states that the law chosen by the parties 
particularly governs, among other things: (1) interpretation issues; 
(2) performance issues; (3) the various ways of extinguishing 
obligations, and prescription and limitation of actions; and (4) the 
consequences of nullity of the contract.33  However, the Regulation 
does contain limitations to these rules.  Under Article 3, the choice 
of law by the parties must not be enforced “where all other elements 
relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in a 
country other than the country whose law has been chosen,” or 
where EU law cannot be preempted by agreement.34  Further, the 
Regulation includes a public policy exception under Article 21.35 
 
 30 Id. at art. 31(2). 
 31 See generally Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, 2008 O.J. (L 
177) 6 [hereinafter Rome I Regulation]. 
 32 Id. at art. 3(1). 
 33 Id. at art. 12(1)(a–b, d–e). 
 34 Id. at art. 3(3–4). 
 35 Id. at art. 21 (“The application of a provision of the law of any country specified 
by this Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with 
the public policy (ordre public) of the forum.”). 
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Unlike in the Brussels I Regulation, Rome I provides for 
“universal application,” meaning the law chosen by the parties 
“shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Member State.”36  
However, this universal application requirement is still arguably 
limited with respect to the interpretation of forum selection clauses 
due to the limited application and discretionary rules of the Brussels 
I Regulation.  Case examples from the EU countries discussed 
below show how courts faced with the interpretation of a forum 
selection clause under a contract that selects a non-EU court and 
non-EU law only sometimes discuss the application of Rome I, and 
other times leave both Rome I and Brussels I aside.  Theoretically, 
under the black letter law of the Regulations, a court in an EU 
country applying Rome I based on the universal applicability 
provision in the Regulation could find that under Article 12 of Rome 
I, a forum selection clause must be interpreted by the law chosen by 
the parties and any discretion of the court under Brussels I is limited 
to enforcement issues.  Yet, case examples show it is not clear that 
courts in EU Member States always find such a connection between 
the Rome I and Brussels I Regulations.  Instead, they sometimes 
lean on the discretionary enforcement provisions in the Brussels I 
Regulation when having to interpret the meaning of a forum 
selection clause. 
3. The Lugano Convention 
International treaties to which the European Union is a party 
also play a role in EU private international law.  The most notable 
of such treaties is the Lugano Convention.37  The Lugano 
Convention is a treaty between the European Community, the 
Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, the Kingdom of 
Norway, and the Swiss Confederation.38 
 
 36 Id. at art. 2. 
 37 The full name of the convention is the Lugano Convention of 30 October 2007 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 2007 O.J. (L 339) 3 [hereinafter Lugano Convention]. 
 38 Lugano Convention 2007, SCHWEIZERISCHE EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT (Jun. 9, 2011), 
https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/wirtschaft/privatrecht/lugue-2007.html 
[https://perma.cc/5LDZ-EKNB].  The Convention entered into force in the European 
Union, Denmark, and Norway on 1 January, 2010, in Switzerland on 1 January, 2011, and 
in Iceland on 1 May, 2011.  Id.  The 2007 convention replaced the previously enacted 
Lugano Convention of 1988, which was a convention that was designed to work parallel 
with the original Brussels Convention from 1968.  The revision of the Lugano Convention 
was undertaken simultaneously with revising the Brussels Convention, with the overall 
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Like the Brussels I Regulation, the Lugano Convention also 
generally requires the enforcement of jurisdiction clauses between 
parties to the convention.  Under Article 23(1) of the convention, if 
parties agreed “that a court or the courts of a State bound by [the] 
Convention are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which 
have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal 
relationship,” and at least one party of the dispute is domiciled in a 
State bound by the convention, the agreement between the parties 
should be upheld.39  While this part of Article 23 only applies to 
countries who are parties to the Convention, Article 23(3) provides 
a preference to the jurisdiction chosen by parties who are not 
domiciled in a state bound by the Convention.  It does this by not 
allowing courts of states bound by the Convention to establish 
jurisdiction over a matter under a jurisdiction clause pointing to a 
court in a non-party state, unless the chosen court(s) have declined 
jurisdiction.40  As in the Brussels I Regulation, Article 23 also states 
that a jurisdiction clause is presumed to be exclusive unless the 
parties agreed otherwise.41  Further mirroring the Brussels I 
Regulation, the Lugano Convention also provides certain 
exceptions to enforcing a jurisdiction clause in matters related to 
insurance, employment, rights in rem, and consumers.42  Uniquely, 
the Lugano Convention also contains an article under which a party 
has a right to bring a claim in a jurisdiction other than the 
jurisdiction agreed to by the parties in a jurisdiction clause if the 
jurisdiction agreement was concluded for the benefit of only one 
party.43 
4. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
The European Union is also a ratifying party to the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (the “Convention”).44  
 
goal of harmonizing the two conventions.  See generally Professor Fausto Pocar, 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters, 2009 O.J. (C 319) 1 (2009). 
 39 Lugano Convention, supra note 37, at art. 23(1). 
 40 Id. at art. 23(3). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at art. 13, 17, 21–22. 
 43 Id. at art. 17(3). 
 44 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98 
[https://perma.cc/C2SS-H27Y] [hereinafter Hague Convention]. Denmark is excepted 
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While the applicability of the Convention is limited given the small 
number of countries that have ratified it, the Convention should still 
be considered in the European Union’s private international law 
scheme.45  The Convention attempts to establish “uniform rules on 
jurisdiction and on the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in civil and commercial matters” between contracting 
states.46  Article 5 of the Convention provides that a forum selection 
clause designating the court(s) of a contracting state should have 
jurisdiction is enforceable unless the clause is null and void under 
the law of that contracting state.47  Article 5 also requires the 
contracting state designated in a choice-of-court agreement to 
accept jurisdiction.48  Under Article 5, the Convention is effectively 
limited in that, similar to the Brussels I Regulation, it is only 
applicable when: (1) the forum interpreting the jurisdiction clause 
is a contracting party to the Convention; and (2) the jurisdiction 
clause selects courts in a country that is a party to the Convention. 
5. Summary Remarks 
These four instruments—the Brussels I Regulation, Rome I 
Regulation, Lugano Convention, and the Hague Choice of Court 
Agreement—are at the center of many cases before courts in EU 
Member States which concern the interpretation of forum selection 
clauses.  Theoretically, where a court in an EU Member State is 
required to interpret a forum selection clause that designates 
jurisdiction to be in the courts of another EU Member State or 
country bound by the Lugano Convention, Article 12 of Rome I 
requires the court to refer to the law chosen by the parties for 
 
from the European Union’s ratification of the Convention.  See Status Table for the 
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HCCH (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98 
[https://perma.cc/LN6L-9VP8] [hereinafter Status Table]. 
 45 The Convention was concluded in 2005 and, at this point, has been ratified by only 
Mexico, Singapore, and the European Union.  While the Convention has also been signed 
by China, Montenegro, Ukraine, and the United States, these countries have not yet ratified 
the Convention and as a result the Convention remains inapplicable to these countries. 
Status Table, supra note 44.  
 46 Hague Convention, supra note 44, at Preamble. 
 47 Id. at art. 5(1). 
 48 Under Article 5, a state chosen in a choice-of-court clause is prevented from 
declining jurisdiction based on finding—for example, as courts in the United States often 
find under the doctrine of forum non conveniens—that the dispute should be heard in 
another court.  Id. at art. 5(2). 
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resolving interpretation issues.  However, the rules established by 
these regulations are limited in that the Brussels I Regulation and 
the Lugano Convention do not directly apply to cases when the 
forum selection clause designates a non-EU country to have 
jurisdiction over the dispute.  In such cases, EU Member States have 
to turn to their own private international law rules.  Further, the 
Brussels I Regulation provides the court with a great deal of 
discretion under its procedural rules and does not require it to stay 
a case due to the existence of a forum selection clause.  This makes 
predicting how a court in an EU Member State will interpret forum 
selection clauses very difficult.  Thus, despite the universal 
application of Rome I, the effect of these three regulations working 
together is ultimately weakened by the limitations of the other three 
instruments. 
B. EU Member State Reports 
This section will outline how three Member States of the 
European Union—Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom—
address the enforcement and interpretation of jurisdiction clauses.    
A comparison of these three Member States highlights the 
differences in civil law systems (Austria and Germany) and 
common law systems (the United Kingdom).  It also explores 
differences among civil law systems between countries which 
imbed private international law rules in their national law 
(Germany) and countries which separate private international law 
into an individual act of legislation within their national law 
(Austria). 
1. Germany49 
Germany is a federal republic consisting of sixteen federal states 
(“Bundesländer”).50  The court system is structured mainly within 
the federal states, with the exception of the highest federal courts 
where matters from the states can ultimately be appealed to.51  With 
 
 49 Research on German law and cases was primarily conducted using the databases 
Beck-online: die Datenbank and Juris-das Rechtsportal.  Any translations, unless 
otherwise noted, were completed by the author of this paper. 
 50 Judicial Systems in Member States – Germany, EUROPEAN E-JUSTICE (Feb. 20, 
2013), https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_judicial_systems_in_member_states-16-de-
en.do?member=1 [https://perma.cc/8KDH-7CPV] [hereinafter Judicial Systems – 
Germany].   
 51 Id. 
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regard to court hierarchy, within each federal state there are local 
courts (Amtsgerichte) and regional courts (Landesgerichte).  
Depending on the value of the matter, either the local courts or 
regional courts will have original jurisdiction over a matter.52  The 
regional courts sometimes also have appellate jurisdiction over 
judgments appealed from the local courts.53  The federal states also 
have higher regional courts (Oberlandesgerichte), which hear 
appeals against original judgments from regional courts.54  Finally, 
there are courts at the central federal level, those which serve as 
appellate courts of last instance for issues of law from the lower 
courts, and the highest federal court (the Bundesgerichtshof or 
“BGH”).55  The court system is also structured into six specific 
branches of specialized subject-matter jurisdictions, including 
ordinary jurisdiction (which includes civil and criminal matters), 
constitutional jurisdiction, labor jurisdiction, general administrative 
jurisdiction, fiscal jurisdiction, and social jurisdiction.56  The court 
a case should be brought before depends on which court has subject-
matter jurisdiction within these six categories.57  The higher federal 
courts, which hear appeals, are also organized into these categories.   
As German law is a civil law system, case law does not have the 
binding force that it does in common law systems.  However, where 
the civil law does not address certain specific private international 
law issues, judicial interpretation does play an important role.  In 
some ways, German judges also often play a more active role than 
judges in common law systems.  As put by one scholar, “German 
judges see themselves as partners in an ongoing dialogue between 
 
 52 See The Courts of Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (2005) 
http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/courts_of_law.pdf?__blob=publication
File&v=3 [https://perma.cc/96XU-GJVW].  Local courts have original jurisdiction over 
claims up to a value of 5,000 Euro and regional courts have original jurisdiction over 
claims with a value exceeding 5,000 Euro. 
 53 Id.  To appeal a judgment from the local court to the regional court, the value of 
the claim must exceed 600 Euro.  Both issues of fact and law may be appealed to the 
regional court. 
 54 Id.  The higher regional court has appellate jurisdiction over issues of fact or law 
from the regional courts. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Judicial Systems – Germany, supra note 50. 
 57 For example, if the case is a labor law case, the case will be brought before the 
proper labor court within the federal state, often before the lowest local or regional court 
depending on the value of the dispute. 
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practitioners and academic writers, aimed at finding adequate 
solutions to legal problems.”58 
a. Summary of Relevant Law 
The regulation of private international law in countries in the 
European Union like Germany stems first and foremost from the EU 
law discussed above.  Given the amount of EU legislation on private 
international law, German private international law immediately 
points out the primacy of EU law in Article 3(1) of the Introductory 
Act to the Civil Code (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuche, or “EGBGB”).59  Under Article 3(2) of the EGBGB, 
private international law rules that are directly applicable in national 
law under international conventions or treaties also take precedence 
over German national law.60  If the private international law rules 
under EU law or another international convention or treaty cannot 
solve an issue in a particular case, German courts will apply German 
private international law rules.61  These rules are primarily found in 
the EGBGB; however, there are also private international law rules 
relating to specific types of cases found elsewhere in German law.62 
With regard to choice-of-law clauses, Germany in general 
applies the principle, whether under the Rome I Regulation or under 
its own private international law, that the law chosen by the parties 
governs a contract.63  The choice of law must however be clearly 
expressed or determinable with reasonable certainty by the 
circumstances of a case.64  Further, the rights of third parties in non-
 
 58 Jan von Hein, Germany, 2101, 2103 in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter Hein, Germany]. 
 59 EINFÜHRUNGSGESETZ ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHE [EGBGB] 
[INTRODUCTORY ACT TO THE CIVIL CODE], §1, art. 3(1), translation at https://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_bgbeg/englisch_bgbeg.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KVW-HNUT] 
[hereinafter EGBGB] (Ger.). 
 60 Id. at §1, art. 3(2).  This would include, for example, private international law rules 
under the United Nations Convention of 11 April 1980 on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG).  Hein, Germany, supra note 58, at 2102. 
 61 EGBGB, supra note 59; see also Hein, Germany, supra note 58. 
 62 Many of the conflict of law rules in German law came directly from the Rome I 
Regulation.  Articles 1 through 21 of Rome I were implemented into Articles 27 to 37 of 
the EGBGB.  Some of the more specific provisions from Rome I were included in laws 
that are situated in the various codes of German law. 
 63 Hein, Germany, supra note 58, at 2102. 
 64 Id. 
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contractual obligations cannot be prejudiced by any choice-of-law 
agreement between parties.65  Importantly, German courts “as a 
matter of principle” have a duty “to determine the content of 
applicable foreign law,” sometimes with the help of court-appointed 
experts.66  The possibility to appeal the interpretation of foreign law 
in German courts is limited to procedural errors.67 
With regard to jurisdiction clauses, German courts also 
generally uphold the agreement of the parties where possible.68  
Similar to EU law, there are a number of exceptions under which a 
German court can refuse to apply foreign law, including a general 
public policy exception under Article 6 of the EGBGB.69  At least 
one German court has held an exclusive jurisdiction clause will not 
be enforceable in cases where there is “reasonable fear” (nahe 
liegende Gefahr) that a foreign court would not apply mandatory 
German law in certain cases.70 
b. Case Examples71 
While there is no provision in German law that specifically 
 
 65 EGBGB, supra note 59, at art. 42. 
 66 Id.; see also Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [German Civil Procedure Rules], § 293. 
 67 Hein, Germany, supra note 58, at 2102.  “Whereas a failure to apply conflicts rules 
correctly justifies an appeal to the Federal Court of Justice, Germany’s highest civil court 
has consistently declined to review whether the lower courts have committed an error in 
applying foreign law to the case.  Rather, an appeal to the Federal Court in such cases 
would only be successful if the lower court has failed to establish the content of foreign 
law in a correct procedural manner.”  Id. 
 68 See generally Dr. Matthias Weller, Auslegung internationaler 
Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen als ausschließlich und Wirkungserstreckung auf die Klage 
des anderen Teils gegen den falsus procurator, IPRax 2006, 444-50. 
 69 The English translation of Article 6 of the EGBGB states, “A provision of the law 
of another country shall not be applied where its application would lead to a result which 
is manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles of German law.”  EGBGB, 
supra note 59, at art. 6.  This translation was taken from the English version of the EGBGB, 
supra note 59. 
 70 See Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Munich, May 17, 2006, 7 
U 1781/06, IHR 2006 ¶ 42 (Ger.).   
 71 Case examples obviously hold less value towards explaining the applicable law in 
civil jurisdictions such as Germany than they do in common law jurisdictions like the 
United States.  This is particularly true given such case law has no precedential or binding 
effect on German law or courts.  However, when a narrow question such as the one 
addressed in this paper is considered, and there is neither a clear guiding statute to answer 
such a question nor an adequate amount of scholarship on the issue (the author of this 
paper was unable to find any scholarship specifically devoted to this issue in German law), 
134 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
requires it, a review of sample German cases suggests German 
courts are likely to apply the law chosen by the parties in a valid 
choice-of-law clause to interpret a jurisdiction clause, but are just as 
likely to refer to and include German law in their analysis.  Two 
cases which demonstrate these trends are illustrated here: a 2004 
case from the Higher Regional Court of Koblenz and a 2017 case 
from the District Court in Munich.  Notably, both cases illustrate 
the tendency of German courts to refer to German law as somewhat 
of a back-up option. 
In the 2004 case, the dispute arose from a contract between the 
plaintiff and a racing company, which was signed by the defendant 
on behalf of the racing company.72  The defendant claimed Germany 
did not have jurisdiction over the matter due to an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause in the agreement between the plaintiff and Z.F., 
which required all disputes arising out of or in connection with the 
contract to be heard by the court where Z.F. was headquartered in 
Ohio.73  The choice-of-law clause in the agreement indicated U.S. 
 
case examples are arguably the only source for answering such a research question.  In 
other words, if one wants to have an idea of how a jurisdiction clause would be interpreted 
in Germany, one should turn to examples of situations where such interpretation must 
happen in German courts.  It is worth noting that any survey of German case examples is 
limited by the mere fact that there simply are not many German cases addressing the 
narrow issue of this paper.  This paper attempts to identify and exemplify trends in German 
cases involving the interpretation of jurisdiction clauses despite such limitations. 
 72 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Koblenz June 24, 2004, 5 U 
1353/02 (Ger.).  The plaintiff, a professional racecar driver domiciled in Monaco, signed 
a contract with a racing company “Z.F. L.L.C.” (“Z.F.”), a U.S. company incorporated in 
Delaware and headquartered in Ohio.  Under the contract, the plaintiff was to drive in a 
race series held in the United States in 2001 in exchange for $300,000.  5 U 1353/02 ¶ 4.  
The defendant in the case was the CEO of a German racing team registered as a German 
limited liability company which also owned 50% of Z.F.  Id. ¶ 3.  The defendant signed 
the contract with the plaintiff on behalf of Z.F.  Id. ¶ 4.  Before the race took place, Z.F. 
cancelled the contract with the plaintiff, claiming that the defendant did not have the proper 
representative authority to enter the contract with the plaintiff on Z.F.’s behalf.   Id. at ¶ 8.  
The plaintiff then filed a claim against the defendant as the “falsus procurator” (Latin for 
unauthorized agent) demanding payment for the $300,000 he would have received had the 
defendant not falsely represented Z.F. in the transaction.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
 73 OLG 5 U 1353/02, supra note 72, at ¶¶ 5, 15, 32.  The jurisdiction clause in the 
case translated to read, “For all disputes arising out of or in connection with this contract 
including the termination and the continuing effect of this contract, the responsible court 
of the team is agreed upon, provided another jurisdiction is not required by the law.”  Id. 
at ¶ 5.  The German version of the jurisdiction clause stated, “Für alle Streitigkeiten 
aus/oder in Zusammenhang mit diesem Vertrag einschließlich der Beendigung und 
Fortwirkung nach Beendigung dieses Vertrages wird als Gericht . . . das zuständige 
Gericht des Teams vereinbart, soweit nicht aufgrund gesetzlicher Bestimmungen ein 
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law governed.74  The plaintiff argued the contract was not valid 
given the defendant’s lack of representative authority, and the 
jurisdiction clause in the contract would therefore also not be 
valid.75  The lower court in the case found it irrelevant whether the 
contract was valid because even the effects of an action by an 
unauthorized third party with regard to the agreement had to be 
decided in the courts designated by the parties in their agreement, 
and Germany therefore did not have jurisdiction over the case.76 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued the jurisdiction clause was not 
valid because substantive U.S. law would not recognize the 
prorogation of the Ohio court, or, in other words, enforce the 
jurisdiction clause.77  On appeal, the defendant reiterated his 
arguments in the lower court, adding that the jurisdiction clause 
applied to third parties because even the consequences of the actions 
of an unauthorized agent fall within the scope of the agreement.78 
On its own initiative, the Senate (a panel of a certain number of 
judges in Germany) obtained an expert opinion on U.S. law.79  The 
expert opined that, under Ohio law, the jurisdiction clause would be 
valid but it was very unlikely that the jurisdiction clause would be 
 
anderer Gerichtsstand zwingend vorgeschrieben ist.”  Id.  The translation of the forum 
selection clause is particularly interesting in this case because the sentence in German “das 
zuständige Gericht des Teams,” which translated to “the responsible court of the team” 
makes very little sense in English.  Even in the German language, the court found that 
under the wording of the forum selection clause, the extent and scope of the clause was 
not clear because the parties did not choose a specific court in the United States, which 
required the court to consider the facts and circumstances of the case.  Considering such 
facts and circumstances, the court found this clause to mean to suggest the courts selected 
were those in Ohio.  
 74 OLG 5 U 1353/02, supra note 72, at ¶ 6.  The choice-of-law clause translated to 
read, “[t]he law of the United States applies.”  Id.  The original German text read, “[e]s 
gilt das Recht der Vereinigten Staaten.”  Id. 
 75 Id. at ¶ 18. 
 76 Id. at ¶ 19; see also Landesgericht [LG] [District Court] Koblenz Aug. 26, 2002, 
4 O 404/01 (Ger.).  The case does not state whether the lower court applied Ohio law in 
the interpretation of the forum selection clause to determine whether, under Ohio law, the 
defendant’s action as a third party would fall under the scope of the forum selection clause. 
 77 OLG 5 U 1353/02, supra note 72, at ¶ 21.  The plaintiff further argued that there 
was no agreement between him and the defendant, given the defendant acted without 
authority, and the liability of an agent acting without authorization is governed by the law 
where the power of attorney would have been executed, which in this case was Germany. 
Id. at ¶ 22. 
 78 OLG 5 U 1353/02, supra note 72, at ¶ 27. 
 79 Id. at ¶ 28. 
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applicable against an unauthorized agent as a third party.  This is 
because under the procedural law of Ohio, jurisdiction clauses do 
not apply to third parties other than in narrow exceptions, such as 
when contracts are made on behalf of third parties (for example, in 
inheritance matters) or when the third party is closely related to the 
matter.80  Given the narrow exceptions did not apply in this case, the 
expert opined that the claim at issue would not fall within the scope 
of the jurisdiction clause under Ohio law.  In interpreting the 
jurisdiction clause based on the expert’s opinion on Ohio law, the 
court indicated the scope of the jurisdiction clause did not include 
the plaintiffs claim.81 
However, the court went further than the interpretation of the 
scope of the jurisdiction clause under Ohio law and found the 
jurisdiction clause could not be enforced for separate reasons 
grounded solely on enforcement issues.82  It was possible for the 
court, based on the interpretation of the clause under Ohio law that 
the dispute would not fall within the scope of the clause, to find the 
jurisdiction clause should not be enforced.  However, the German 
court decided the jurisdiction clause should not be enforced for 
reasons not directly related to interpretation issues.83  While it made 
several references to Ohio law, the court based its decision on 
principles of German law. 
 
 80 Id. at ¶ 38. 
 81 Id. at ¶ 32-33.  Interestingly, the court stated that the issue of whether a jurisdiction 
clause applied to a third party under facts such as this where a plaintiff, who did not want 
the jurisdiction clause enforced, was suing a third party, was still undecided by German 
law and courts. 
 82 Citing several cases and literature on German law, the court held that the 
derogation of a German court cannot be judged independently of the fate of the prorogation 
of another court.  OLG 5 U 1353/02, supra note 72, at ¶ 36.  In other words, the jurisdiction 
clause indirectly declares that German courts do not have jurisdiction (derogation of 
German courts) because the clause states the courts of Ohio have exclusive jurisdiction 
(prorogation of Ohio courts).  The court held that a decision based on a jurisdiction clause 
indicating German courts do not have jurisdiction cannot be judged independently of 
whether the court agreed upon by the parties, in this case an Ohio court, would even accept 
jurisdiction at all.  In such cases, German courts are required to determine whether or not 
the selected foreign court would accept jurisdiction, to ensure the plaintiff has legal 
protection and the possibility of having their case heard in a court.  Id. at ¶ 37.  Based on 
the expert opinion on Ohio law, the court found that an Ohio court would not accept 
jurisdiction of this dispute because, under Ohio law, Ohio would not have personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.  Id. at ¶ 39-51.  Further, the court noted that Ohio was also 
not likely to hear the case due to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.  Id. at ¶ 52. 
 83 Id. at ¶ 53. 
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The second German case example, a recent case before the 
district court in Munich, illustrates how a German court, citing to 
the universal applicability of the Rome I Regulation, applies foreign 
law to the interpretation of a jurisdiction clause even where the 
clause points to a non-EU state.84  However, as previously 
mentioned and as the below case exhibits, it is not uncommon for 
German courts to also analyze the case under German law when 
German law reaches the same conclusion. 
In this case the plaintiff was a hotel owner in Germany and the 
defendant was a website based in the United States which allowed 
the public to rate and review hotels.85  The plaintiff hotel entered an 
agreement with the defendant in order to be listed on the website.86  
This agreement referenced terms and conditions which contained a 
combined choice-of-law and jurisdiction clause, stating 
Massachusetts law applied to the agreement, and courts in 
Massachusetts had exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising out 
of or in relation to use of the website.87 
 
 84 Landesgericht [LG] Munich I Aug. 11, 2017, 33 O 8184/16 (Ger.). 
 85 Id. at ¶¶ 1-3.  The website had other features in addition to rating and reviewing 
hotels, such as allowing the public to book trips through the website. 
 86 LG 33 O 8184/16, supra note 84, at ¶ 4. 
 87 Id. at ¶ 12.  The translated combined choice-of-law and jurisdiction clause states: 
“This website is operated by a US-American company and the law of the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, USA applies to this Agreement.  You hereby consent to the exclusive 
substantive and local jurisdiction of the courts in Massachusetts, USA, and acknowledge 
the indisputable fairness and reasonableness of proceedings in these courts for all disputes 
arising out of or in connection with the use of this website, you agree that all possible 
claims you have arising from in connection with or against this website, must be decided 
by a court with subject-matter jurisdiction in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  The 
use of this website is prohibited in a region where any of the provisions of these Terms 
and Conditions, including this paragraph, are not legally valid.  This does not apply in 
circumstances in which the applicable law in your country of residence applies the law of 
another jurisdiction and/or another jurisdiction is required which cannot be contractually 
excluded.”  Id. at ¶ 12.  The original German version of the clause stated: “Diese Website 
wird von einem US-amerikanischen Unternehmen betrieben und für diese – Vereinbarung 
gilt das Recht des Commonwealth of Massachusetts, USA.  Sie willigen hiermit in die 
ausschließliche sachliche und örtliche Zuständigkeit der Gerichte in Massachusetts, USA, 
ein und erkennen die Billigkeit und Angemessenheit von Verfahren in diesen Gerichten 
für alle Streitigkeiten aus oder im Zusammenhang mit der Nutzung dieser Website als 
unstreitig an, Sie stimmen zu, dass über alle Ansprüche, die Sie möglicherweise aus oder 
im Zusammenhang mit dieser Website gegen . . . haben, von einem sachlich zuständigen 
Gericht im Commonwealth of Massachusetts entschieden werden muss.  Die Nutzung 
dieser Website ist in jeder Region unzulässig, in der nicht alle Bestimmungen dieser 
Nutzungsbedingungen, unter anderem dieser Absatz, rechtswirksam sind.  Das 
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The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in a Munich 
district court after the plaintiff refused to remove certain comments 
about the hotel on the website.88  The defendant argued the Munich 
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute due to the 
exclusive jurisdiction clause in the terms and conditions, which was 
valid and enforceable under the German Code of Civil Procedure.89  
Citing German case law, the defendant also claimed the 
interpretation of the exclusive jurisdiction clause should not be done 
by German law but by the law of Massachusetts.90 
The Munich court ultimately held it did not have jurisdiction to 
hear the case due to the jurisdiction clause.91  In its decision, the 
court stated the legal requirements and effects of a jurisdiction 
clause, including to whom the clause applies, is to be primarily 
determined by the substantive law that governs the agreement.  The 
determination of which substantive law governs is to be based on 
the rules of German Private International Law.92  The court then 
cited to Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation to support its opinion 
that the agreement was governed by the law chosen by the parties, 
which was Massachusetts law.93  The court further found the 
exclusive jurisdiction clause to be enforceable and valid under 
Massachusetts law, referencing an affidavit from a U.S. attorney 
 
Vorstehende gilt nicht in dem Umfang, in dem das anwendbare Recht im Land Ihres 
Wohnsitzes die Anwendung eines anderen Rechts und/oder eine andere Zuständigkeit 
erfordert und dies nicht vertraglich ausgeschlossen werden kann.”  Id.  To sign up for the 
website, the plaintiff was required to accept the terms and conditions including the 
jurisdiction and choice-of-law clause.  Id. 
 88 In 2016, the plaintiff’s lawyer sent a letter to the website requesting certain 
comments about the hotel be deleted because they were untrue and would massively harm 
the reputation of the hotel.  LG 33 O 8184/16, supra note 84, at ¶ 17.  When the website 
did not remove the comments, the plaintiff brought suit against the hotel in the district 
court in Munich, claiming the Munich court had jurisdiction because the reviews were 
visible to the German public, the website used a German domain, communicated with the 
customers (such as the hotel) and users of the website in German, and targeted German 
consumers and service providers.  Id.  The plaintiff also argued they would be placed at an 
unfair disadvantage by having to sue the defendant in Massachusetts, which is 
impermissible under § 307 of the German Civil Code.  Id.  With regard to the desired 
remedy, the plaintiff petitioned the court to require the defendant to remove the reviews 
and to pay for damages and attorney fees.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
 89 LG 33 O 8184/16, supra note 84, at ¶ 35. 
 90 Id. at ¶¶ 35, 41. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at ¶¶ 43-44. 
 93 Id. at ¶ 45. 
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submitted by the defendant.94 
However, the court took its analysis a step further and stated that 
even if it did find that German law applied to the case, the exclusive 
jurisdiction clause would still be valid and enforceable under 
German law.  The parties freely contracted to certain terms and 
conditions which did not violate German law, and such terms and 
conditions clearly contained an exclusive jurisdiction agreement.95  
The court then proceeded to run through a number of the potential 
arguments under German law that could render a jurisdiction clause 
to be invalid or unenforceable, and found that none of those 
arguments applied to that case.96  Hence, regardless of the court’s 
analysis of the case under Massachusetts law—which the court did 
not discuss in length—the court would have reached the same 
conclusion with regard to the enforcement and interpretation of the 
jurisdiction clause under German law.  As in the 2004 Koblenz case, 
the court seemed to use German law as back-up to strengthen its 
decision.   
2. Austria 
Austria is a federal republic consisting of nine federal states 
(Bundesländer).  Each federal state is divided into districts (Bezirke) 
and the districts are divided into municipalities (Gemeinde).97  
Courts in Austria are organized on four levels: district courts 
(Bezirksgerichte), regional courts (Landesgerichte), higher regional 
courts of appeal (Oberlandesgerichte), and the Supreme Court 
(Oberster Gerichtshof or OGH).98  Similar to German courts, courts 
of the first instance include the district and regional courts 
(depending on the value of the claim), the regional courts hear 
appeals from the district courts, and the higher regional courts hear 
appeals from the lower courts.99  The Supreme Court is the court of 
 
 94 Id. at ¶ 46. 
 95 Id. at ¶ 47. 
 96 Id. at ¶¶ 48-56. 
 97 THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA FED. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE AUSTRIAN JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM 6 (2014), 
https://www.justiz.gv.at/web2013/file/8ab4ac8322985dd501229ce2e2d80091.de.0/brosc
huere_oesterr_justiz_en_download.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PJW-NU4S]. 
 98 Id. at 9-10. 
 99 Id. at 10.  District courts in Austria decide claims up to a value of 15,000 Euro.  Id. 
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last instance in civil and criminal law cases.100  As Austria is a civil 
law system, the case law of the highest court is not binding for lower 
courts.  However, case law from the Supreme Court is a “major 
contributor towards preserving the uniform application of the law” 
in Austria, and lower courts are typically guided by such case law.101 
a. Summary of Relevant Law 
Private international law in Austria is primarily governed by the 
International Private Law Act (Bundesgesetz über das international 
Privatrecht or “IPRG”), a codified statute adopted in 1978 that 
specifically relates to private international law.102  Additional 
private international law rules related to specific areas of law, such 
as consumer protection, immovable property, and insurance, are 
codified in other acts of legislation.103  Under § 53 of the IPRG, 
Austria’s domestic private international law rules take a back seat 
to any international agreements.104  However, for cases which 
cannot be determined based on EU law or under rules from an 
international agreement, Austria’s domestic private international 
law rules under the IPRG would apply.105 
Similar to other private international law structures in European 
countries, the IPRG contains typical conflict of law rules which are 
divided by specific topics such as the rights of individuals, family 
law, property law, and—more relevant to this paper—the law of 
obligations or contract law.106  Section 35 of the IPRG governs the 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 10.   
 102 Bundesgesetz ueber das international Privatrecht [IPR-Gesetz or IPRG], Federal 
Law Gazette 304/1978 [hereinafter IPRG], 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnum
mer=10002426 [https://perma.cc/A4BD-LYU7].  The author of this paper was unable to 
locate an English translation of the Austrian IPRG. 
 103 Applicable Law - Austria, EUR. JUD. NETWORK IN CIV. AND COM. MATTERS (July 
3, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/applicable_law/applicable_law_aus_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZVE7-M9B9]. 
 104 IPRG, supra note 102, at § 53(1).  Austria is currently a party to only a select 
number of international agreements which could have an effect on private international 
law rules, including a handful of agreements under the Hague Convention related to issues 
such as child support and testamentary dispositions.  See Applicable law - Austria, supra 
note 103, at ¶¶ 1.2-1.3. 
 105 IPRG, supra note 102, at § 53(1) 
 106 The Austrian IPRG is subdivided by sections, or what may be thought of as 
chapters (“Abschnitte” in German) relative to these topics, with an additional section at 
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private international rules for contractual obligations.107  In line with 
typical private international law rules, Section 35 includes a 
provision with the typical conflict of law rules for contractual 
matters, which provides that the applicable law to contractual 
obligations is the law of the state where the performing party has its 
habitual residence or, if the performing party is a company, the law 
of the state where the company conducts business related to the 
contract.108  However, the third part of Section 35 allows an Austrian 
court to apply the law of a different State if it is clear from the 
totality of the circumstances that the contractual obligation has an 
obvious closer connection with a state other than the state 
designated by the conflict of law rule mentioned above.109  Further, 
a public policy exception is included in Section 6 of the IPRG.110 
Unlike the structure of private international law rules of some 
other European nations such as Germany, the Austrian law gives a 
clear initial preference to choice-of-law agreements by including 
provisions which clearly delineate the relationship of the Rome I 
Regulation and Austria’s domestic law on choice-of-law 
agreements.111  According to Section 35(1), contractual obligations 
that do not fall within the scope of the Rome I Regulation are to be 
judged by the law implicitly or explicitly agreed upon by the 
parties.112  The Austrian IPRG also contains a unique provision 
specifically related to the application of foreign law: Section 3 of 
the IPRG translates to read, “[a]uthoritative foreign law is 
applicable ex officio and as it is in its original area of application.”113  
 
the beginning for general provisions and a section at the end for final provisions.   Germans 
are more likely to read an English section (§) symbol as “paragraph” (“Paragraf” in 
German) instead of a “section.” 
 107 IPRG, supra note 102, at § 35. 
 108 Id. at § 35(2). 
 109 Id. at § 35(3). 
 110 Id. at § 6. 
 111 Id. at § 35(1). 
 112 Id. at §35(1). 
 113 IPRG, supra note 102, at § 3.  The German version of Section 3 reads, “[i]st 
fremdes Recht massgebend, so ist es von Amts wegen und wie in seinem urspruenglichen 
Geltungsbereich anzuwenden.”  It is worth noting that the word “geltungsbereich,” which 
has been translated here to mean “area” of application, can be interpreted to mean area 
related to the scope of application or to the jurisdiction.  Essentially, under this section, 
foreign law is to be applied as it would in the jurisdiction where the law originates from, 
which would indirectly include the scope in which the jurisdiction would apply its own 
law.   
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The ex officio requirement is expanded on in Section 4 of the IPRG, 
which states that foreign law is to be determined ex officio, with the 
help of expert opinions, assistance from the parties, or information 
from the federal ministry of justice if necessary.114  If the content of 
foreign law cannot be determined within a reasonable period of 
time, Austrian law applies.115 
b. Case Examples116 
This section includes one Austrian case example that suggests it 
is difficult to predict how an Austrian court will handle the 
interpretation of a jurisdiction clause.  This is due not only to the 
limited number of cases available on the issue, but also because the 
Supreme Court in the case example was not consistent in the 
methods or law it applied to interpret issues within that single case.  
Notably, the Supreme Court in this case did the reverse of what 
German courts tend to do, and considered the foreign law chosen by 
the parties for interpretation issues only as a back-up to other law. 
In a 2009 case before the Austrian Supreme Court, the Supreme 
 
 114 Id. at § 4(1). 
 115 Id. at § 4(2). 
 116 Research for Austrian cases was primarily conducted using Lexis Österreich, the 
RDB database, and Rechtsinformationsystem des Bundes (RIS).  It should be noted that in 
general there were simply far fewer Austrian cases available than for other countries 
discussed in this paper.  This could be because cases for lower courts are not readily 
available on the internet.  All but one of the many cases reviewed by the author of this 
paper related to exceptions to the enforcement of jurisdiction clauses, or demonstrated 
when Austrian courts decided not to give regard to jurisdiction clauses due to a public 
policy exception or because the case related to, for example, an employment contract or 
consumers.  Even in late 2017 the Austrian high court was deciding an exception case 
related to consumer contracts, which perhaps suggests such exception issues are not yet 
settled within Austrian law given the highest court was willing to rule on the legal issue.  
See OGH, December 20, 2017, 8 Ob 24/17p, ENTSCHEIDUNG (Austria).  In any case, as 
mentioned previously, given Austria is a civil law country, case law from Austria is not 
binding on Austrian law or courts, and such a limitation should certainly be kept in mind.   
All in all, it is not clear exactly why there are fewer cases available related to the 
enforcement and/or interpretation of jurisdiction clauses.  In the recent December 2017 
case before the Austrian Supreme Court, the court held that the lower courts did not have 
to interpret general terms and conditions under German law, which was chosen by the 
parties through a choice of law clause included in the terms and conditions, where certain 
consumer rights are concerned.  8 Ob 24/17p at 3.  The court’s reasoning was that under 
Austrian consumer protection law, the terms and conditions must be clear and 
comprehensible in form, and that an Austrian court interpreting such terms and conditions 
based on form should apply Austrian consumer protection law instead of the law chosen 
by the parties.  Id.   
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Court interpreted a jurisdiction clause partly without citing to any 
authority, partly using customary law, and by only citing to the law 
chosen by the parties as an alternative basis for its decision.117  The 
plaintiff was a ship-owner seated in Switzerland and the defendant 
was a company that sold wood with its seat in Austria.118  The 
defendant agreed to sell wood to Libya and arranged for the plaintiff 
to deliver the wood from Austria to Libya.119  The Bill of Lading 
contained a jurisdiction clause, which translated to, “every dispute 
that arises from this Bill of Lading, is to be decided in the country 
in which the conductor of cargo has its main seat and the law of such 
country shall apply, unless otherwise stated in this document.”120  A 
dispute arose between the parties when the ship was detained in 
Libya because the goods on the ship did not match the description 
of the goods in the Bill of Lading.121  The plaintiff sued the 
defendant in Austria for damages incurred while attempting to get 
its ship released from detainment.122   
The plaintiff claimed Austria had jurisdiction under Article 2 of 
the Brussels I Regulation, and the jurisdiction clause in the Bill of 
Lading did not apply because it was superseded by the Charter 
Agreement.123  The plaintiff further argued that Austria had 
jurisdiction since all of plaintiff’s claims against the defendant arose 
out of the Charter Agreement and not the Bill of Lading.124  
 
 117 OGH, July 8, 2009, 7 Ob 18/09m URTEIL (Austria) [hereinafter 7 Ob 18/09m]. 
 118 7 Ob 18/09m at 2. 
 119 Id. 
 120 The original German version of the jurisdiction clause stated: “Jeder Streitfall, der 
sich aus dem vorliegenden Konnossement ergibt, soll in dem Land entschieden werden, in 
dem der Frachtführer seinen Hauptgeschäftssitz hat und das Gesetz dieses Landes ist 
anzuwenden, es sei denn, es finden sich anderslautende Bestimmungen im vorliegenden 
Dokument.”  Id.  In this case, the conductor of cargo was the plaintiff, who had its main 
seat in Switzerland.  Neither party disputed that the jurisdiction clause would point to 
Swiss courts and Swiss law. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id.  The plaintiff was forced by a court in Libya to pay 65,000 Euro in order to be 
released from all liability surrounding the issues with the Bill of Lading.  The plaintiff also 
claimed damages for expenses related to having to stay in Libya pending the outcome of 
getting its ship released from detainment. 
 123 Id. 
 124 The plaintiff also claimed the Charter Agreement was between the plaintiff, the 
Charter company, and the defendant.  The defendant disputed this point and argued they 
were not party to the Charter Agreement, and the only agreement between them and the 
plaintiff was the Bill of Lading.  Id. at 3. 
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Moreover, even if looking at the Bill of Lading, plaintiff contended 
that the jurisdiction clause in the Bill of Lading was not exclusive, 
and jurisdiction should therefore be decided under Article 17 
paragraph 4 of the Lugano Convention.125  As mentioned earlier, the 
Lugano Convention states if a jurisdiction agreement was concluded 
for the benefit of only one party, that party has the right to bring a 
claim in another court which has jurisdiction under the Lugano 
Convention.126  The defendant argued the jurisdiction clause in the 
Bill of Lading was enforceable and Austria therefore did not have 
jurisdiction.127  The case ultimately went through the appellate 
stages to the Supreme Court.128  The Supreme Court focused on two 
interpretive issues: (1) whether the jurisdiction clause was 
exclusive, and (2) whether the scope of the jurisdiction clause 
covered the damage claims brought by the plaintiff.129 
As to the exclusivity issues, the court found the jurisdiction 
clause to be exclusive.130  Citing to several secondary sources, as 
well as to some German cases, the court first found that for a 
jurisdiction agreement to favor only one party as is meant under 
Article 17(4) of the Lugano Convention, both parties must have 
intended for the agreement to favor only that party.131  Turning to 
 
 125 7 Ob 18/09m, supra note 117. 
 126  Lugano Convention, supra note 37, at art. 17.  The plaintiff in this case was 
headquartered in Switzerland and the defendant was headquartered in Austria, so the 
defendant argued having the case litigated in Switzerland was only to the benefit of the 
plaintiff.  The defendant also argued that liability for any discrepancies between the goods 
on the ship and the description of goods in the Bill of Lading rested on the plaintiff, who 
should have done their due diligence to ensure the Bill of Lading description matched the 
goods that were actually on board the ship. 
 127 7 Ob 18/09m, supra note 117. 
 128 The district court (Landesgericht Klagenfurt) disagreed with the defendant and 
found that Austria had jurisdiction over the case because the claims brought by the plaintiff 
were not within the scope of the Bill of Lading.  The higher regional court 
(Oberlandesgericht Graz) reversed the decision of the district court.  The higher regional 
court found that: (1) according to Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation, Swiss law applies 
to disputes regarding the Charter Agreement; and (2) in the alternative, the Bill of Lading 
also points to Swiss law.  Id. at 3–4.  The higher regional court also found that the parties 
agreed to the Bill of Lading—and thereby the jurisdiction clause—because such contracts 
are standard practice and the plaintiff did not object to the jurisdiction clause in the Bill of 
Lading, rendering the jurisdiction clause to valid, and Austria therefore did not have 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 4.   
 129 Id. at 5. 
 130 Id. 
 131 7 Ob 18/09m, supra note 117, at 6.  The court also found that one party having its 
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the interpretation of the jurisdiction clause with regard to 
exclusivity, without citing to any source, the court interpreted the 
jurisdiction clause to be exclusive based solely on its wording.132  
The court stated, “[i]n the jurisdiction agreement the word 
‘exclusive’ is not used; however, [the jurisdiction clause] includes 
‘every dispute’ that arises out of the Bill of Lading, which has the 
same meaning.”133  Ultimately, without respect to any choice of law 
of the parties, the court held that the jurisdiction clause was 
exclusive and the defendant had a right to enforce the jurisdiction 
clause despite the defendant being seated in Austria.134 
As to the second interpretation question of the scope of the 
jurisdiction clause, the court found the damage claims brought by 
the plaintiff to be included within the scope of the clause.135  The 
courts holding, citing to a decision from the European Court of 
Justice, was primarily based on customary practice in international 
maritime law.136  However, the court went further to provide 
alternative support for its holding on the interpretation of the scope 
of the clause based on Swiss law.  The court noted Swiss law was 
not only the law chosen by the parties, but would also be the 
governing law under Austrian private international law rules.137  The 
court first went into detail on the basics of Swiss maritime law.138  
Citing to Swiss maritime law, the court stated that the terms of the 
Bill of Lading are accepted as part of the overall contracting intent 
of the parties, and such intent—which would include a jurisdiction 
clause—extended to the Charter Agreement unless otherwise 
 
seat in the jurisdiction chosen by the jurisdiction clause is not enough to suggest that party 
is being favored under Article 17(4) of the Lugano Convention.  Id. 
 132 Id. at 6.   
 133 Id. at 5.  The original German sentence stated, “In der Gerichtsstandsvereinbarung 
wird zwar nicht das Wort ‘ausschließlich’ verwendet, doch ‘soll jeder Streitfall’, der sich 
aus dem Konnossement ergibt, davon umfasst sein, was gleichbedeutend ist.” 
 134 Id. at 7. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. (citing Rs C-159/97, Transporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA 
gegen Hugo Trumpy SpA).  According to the court, a Bill of Lading customarily includes 
an enforceable jurisdiction clause, which makes the jurisdiction clause by default valid.  
Citing to several German commentaries and a few cases, the court then simply stated that 
also according to customary practice, the defendant should be able to enforce the 
jurisdiction clause for the claims brought against him by the plaintiff.   
 137 7 Ob 18/09m, supra note 117, at 7. 
 138 Id. at 7–8.  The court also stated Swiss maritime law is similar to German law, and 
then went into detail on the basics of German maritime law.   
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specified by the parties.139  While the court did not cite to Swiss law 
directly related to the interpretation of jurisdiction clauses 
generally, the citation to Swiss maritime law arguably achieved the 
same effect, as the court decided whether or not the claims brought 
by the plaintiff fell within the scope of the jurisdiction clause based 
on applicable Swiss maritime law.140 
Overall, this 2009 case from the highest court in Austria sends 
conflicting messages.  On the one hand, the court in this case applied 
Swiss maritime law—even if as a back-up to other customary law—
to determine whether or not the scope of a jurisdiction clause in a 
Bill of Lading encompassed certain damage claims brought by the 
plaintiff.141  On the other hand, the court simply decided that the 
wording of the jurisdiction clause established the exclusivity of the 
clause, without citing to any authority for such finding or stating 
whose law it was applying to make such a determination.142  Given 
the court was Austrian, one can assume the court, without stating 
otherwise, applied its own law to its interpretation of the wording 
of the jurisdiction clause.  In any case, the court certainly did not 
apply Swiss law to determine whether or not the clause is exclusive, 
and was not clear on the overall applicability of the law chosen by 
the parties to any interpretation issues. 
3. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (U.K.) is a sovereign state divided by three 
jurisdictions: England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.143  
Given only case decisions from England are provided in this paper, 
the court system and hierarchy of England and Wales will be 
discussed here.144  The courts in England and Wales start at the 
 
 139 Id. at 8.   
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 England and Wales, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN E-JUSTICE (Dec. 12, 
2016), https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_judicial_systems_in_member_states-16-ew-
en.do?member=1 [https://perma.cc/964G-F4JY]. 
 144 For more on the court system and hierarchy in Northern Island, see Judicial 
Systems in Member States – Northern Ireland, EUROPEAN E-JUSTICE (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_judicial_systems_in_member_states-16-ni-
en.do?member=1 [https://perma.cc/DS44-MX8T].  For more on the court system and 
hierarchy in Scotland, see Judicial Systems in Member States – Scotland, EUROPEAN E-
JUSTICE (May 7, 2018), https://e-
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lower level with county courts, family courts, and magistrate 
courts.145  In addition, there is the Crown Court, which hears certain 
criminal matters, and a tribunals system, which hears specific types 
of matters, including but not limited to issues decided by executive 
agencies or tax matters.146  There are three levels of appeal that cases 
may reach; first, the High Court—which is made up of three 
divisions including the Queen’s Bench, Family, and Chancery 
divisions—hears appeals from other courts, and has original 
jurisdiction over certain cases.147  The next stage court is the Court 
of Appeal, which hears appeals only on issues of law for either 
criminal or civil matters.148  Finally, the highest court for England 
and Wales is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, which also 
only takes cases for appeal on important issues of law.149 
a. Summary of Relevant Law 
As a Member State of the European Union, private international 
law in the United Kingdom is currently governed by the EU 
legislation already discussed, such as the Brussels Regime and the 




 145 COURTS AND TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, THE STRUCTURE OF THE COURTS, 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/courts-structure-0715.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X8ZG-CSPH]. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Although this EU legislation currently applies to the United Kingdom as a Member 
State of the European Union, this of course will not be the case once the United Kingdom 
leaves the European Union.  The United Kingdom invoked Article 50 of the TEU on 29 
March, 2017 and is expected to be withdrawn from the European Union by 29 March, 
2019.  To ensure a smooth transition, the United Kingdom introduced the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill to Parliament.  The bill essentially incorporates EU legislation into U.K. 
law through one large bill which takes care of gaps for the time being, and the U.K. 
government would then decide which EU laws it wishes to change over time.  The former 
bill is now an Act, currently being reviewed for amendments.  For updates on the status of 
the act, see European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, UK PARLIAMENT (June 26, 2018), 
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html 
[https://perma.cc/HQ7V-XR85].  At the time, it is unknown how cross-border litigation 
and enforcement of judgment issues such as those discussed in the Brussels I and Rome I 
Regulations will be handled in the United Kingdom post-Brexit.  The U.K. Government 
did, however, publish a paper on its intention to continue a cross-border litigation 
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come from common law case law doctrine.  A number of cases make 
up the basic case law that applies to the enforcement and 
interpretation of forum selection clauses in the United Kingdom.151  
Combined, the cases establish that exclusive jurisdiction clauses are 
by default enforceable in the United Kingdom unless the opposing 
party can show “strong reason” why the court should not enforce 
the clause, and jurisdiction clauses are to be liberally interpreted 
unless the clause expressly states otherwise.152 
The 2001 Donohue v. Armco Inc. case established the “strong 
reasons” test.  Under the test, an exclusive jurisdiction clause 
pointing to a non-English jurisdiction will by default be enforceable 
by an English court if a claim that falls within the scope of the 
jurisdiction clause is made in an English court.  However, it will not 
be enforced if the opposing party can show “strong reasons” for 
suing in an English court instead of in the court designated by the 
jurisdiction clause.153  Factors related to the convenience of the 
parties, which were foreseeable at the time the contract was entered 
into, will not be considered by English courts.154  As the High Court 
of Justice stated in the Antec International Ltd. v. Biosafety USA Inc 
case, “[e]ven if there is an unforeseeable factor or a party can point 
to some other reason which, in the interests of justice, points to 
another forum, this does not automatically lead to the conclusion 
that the court should exercise its discretion to release a party from 
 
cooperation framework with the European Union on 22 August, 2017.  See Providing a 





 151 These cases include: Donohue v. Armco Inc., [2001] UKHL 64, [2002] Ll Rep 45 
(UK); Fiona Trust and Holding Corp. v. Privalov, [2007] EWCA Civ 20, [2007] 2 Ll Rep 
267 (UK); and Satyam Comput. Servs. Ltd. v. Upaid Sys. Ltd., [2008] EWCA Civ 487, 
[2008] 2 AE (Comm) 465 (UK).  See also Black Diamond Offshore Ltd v. Fomento De 
Construcciones, [2015] EWHC 1035, 2015 WL 997509, 4 (UK). 
 152 See Donohue, UKHL, Ll Rep; Fiona Trust and Holding Corp., EWCA Civ, Ll Rep;  
and Satyam Comput. Servs. Ltd., EWCA Civ, 2 AE (Comm).  See also Black Diamond 
Offshore Ltd, EWHC, 2015 WL 997509. 
 153 Donohue, UKHL at ¶ 24, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200102/ldjudgmt/jd011213/dono-1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5T36-W9X2]. 
 154 Antec International Ltd. v. Biosafety USA Inc., [2006] EWHC 47 ¶ 7 (UK). 
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its contractual bargain.”155 
Under the 2007 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov case, 
the English Court of Appeal held jurisdiction clauses in an 
international commercial contract should be “liberally 
construed.”156  The House of Lords in the same case agreed with the 
Court of Appeal and found that liberally interpreting a jurisdiction 
clause “promotes legal certainty” and “serves to underline the 
golden rule that if the parties wish to have issues as to the validity 
of their contract decided by one tribunal and issues as to its meaning 
or performance decided by another, they must say so expressly.”157  
In the 2008 case Satyam Computer Services Ltd v. Upaid Systems 
Ltd, the English Court of Appeal stated: “plainly it makes 
commercial sense for a dispute about the validity of the contract to 
be determined under an arbitration agreement (or a jurisdiction 
agreement).  Whether a dispute under a different contract is within 
a jurisdiction agreement depends on the intention of the parties as 
revealed by the agreement.”158 
In the United Kingdom, judges are not required to consider or 
apply foreign law ex officio.159  Instead, parties must bring forth 
evidence regarding foreign law to support any argument that foreign 
law should be applied to an issue, and prove that evidence as a 
factual issue in the case.160  Similar to other jurisdictions, experts are 
usually brought forth as witnesses by parties making such 
arguments.161  Also similar to other jurisdictions, it is not uncommon 
for experts on foreign law to disagree.162   
 
 155 Id. 
 156 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp., EWCA Civ at 2, 1 C.L.C. at 145.  The court went 
further to hold: “The words ‘arising out of’ should cover every dispute except a dispute as 
to whether there was ever a contract at all.  The phrases ‘under’ and ‘out of’ should be 
widely construed.”  Id. 
 157 Id. at 562. 
 158 Satyam Comput. Servs. Ltd. v. Upaid Sys Ltd., [2008] EWCA Civ 487. 
 159 See Andrew Dickinson, United Kingdom, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2616–17 (Jürgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017).  
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See Black Diamond Offshore Ltd. v. Fomento De Construcciones, [2015] EWHC 
1035, 2015 WL 997509 (disputing whether or not English jurisdiction was appropriate for 
loan notes arising out of both Spain and England). 
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b. Case Examples163 
The case examples from the United Kingdom show that English 
courts typically acknowledge the application of foreign law, chosen 
by the parties in a choice-of-law clause, to the interpretation of 
international jurisdiction clauses.  However, as seen in the first case 
example, English courts limit their application to the consideration 
of expert opinions, as opposed to applying foreign law ex officio or 
citing the foreign law directly in their decision.  Moreover, as 
demonstrated by the second case example, some English courts, 
while recognizing the applicability of foreign law, will choose not 
to apply such law if the court reasons that the applicable foreign law 
does not differ significantly from English law. 
In Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd v. Wolffkran GmbH, a 2007 case 
before the English High Court, the court applied the law chosen by 
the parties to govern their relationship to several interpretation 
questions regarding jurisdiction clauses in agreements between the 
parties.  However, the court’s reliance on the foreign law was 
limited to expert opinions and the court did not attempt to directly 
apply or cite to the foreign law in its decision.164  The claimant in 
the case sued the defendant for statutory damages and contribution 
related to underlying personal injury claims from a construction 
accident where a climbing frame and part of a crane fell to the 
ground in London, killing three employees of the claimant and 
injuring two others.165  The claims against the defendant were based 
on the accusation that the defendant was negligent in the design 
and/or manufacture of the climbing frame.166  Two contracts that 
governed the relationship between the parties were discussed in the 
case: a “contract of hire,” under which the claimant rented certain 
 
 163 Research for U.K. cases was conducted using the legal databases Westlaw 
International, Westlaw UK, LexisNexis Academic, and JUSTIS. 
 164 Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd. v. Wolffkran GmbH, [2007] EWHC 857 (TCC), 
[2007] I.L.Pr. 43. 
 165 Id. at 557 (stating that the claimant was an English company engaged in the 
business of supplying tower crane equipment and associated labor to construction 
companies, and that the defendant was a German structural steel contractor which engaged 
in the manufacture of cranes).  Id. at 555–57 (explaining that the claimant and defendant 
had a close business relationship for many years, as the claimant had purchased many 
tower cranes from the defendant and also rented equipment from the defendant and its 
subsidiary crane rental business).   Id. (stating that the claimant was sued in several 
personal injury claims related to the accident).   
 166 Id. at 557 (bringing the damage and contribution claims under an English statute).   
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equipment from the defendant’s subsidiary company (including the 
climbing frame); and a sale contract, through which the claimant 
purchased the crane and other equipment from the defendant.167   
The defendant claimed that the English court did not have 
jurisdiction, due to a jurisdiction clause in the general terms of 
delivery incorporated into the sale contract, which stated: 
 
These business conditions and all legal relations between the contracting 
parties are governed by the law of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
the exclusion of the UN purchase law insofar as our general conditions 
do not apply.  Insofar as the buyer is a qualified merchant, a public 
corporate body, or a public separate estate, the Court of Heilbronn is sole 
competent for any disputes arising directly or indirectly out of the 
contractual relation.168 
 
One of the main issues in the case was whether the claims before 
the court were disputes that fell within the scope of the jurisdiction 
clause in the sales contract, which included two narrow issues of 
interpretation: (1) whether the claimant was a “qualified merchant” 
under the clause; and (2) whether the disputes qualified as “disputes 
arising directly or indirectly out of the contractual relation.”169  Both 
parties had experts on German law.  Based on the opinions of these 
experts, the court used German law to interpret the clause.170  
However, the court notably only mentioned German law as it 
pertains to the first issue of interpretation, and did not mention any 
German law related to the second interpretation issue.171 
The defendant alternatively argued that the contract of hire 
incorporated general conditions for hire, which it claimed also 
included a jurisdiction clause pointing to courts in Germany.172  This 
 
 167 Id. at 556–57 (referring to the climbing frame and crane as part of the accident; 
however, the claimant rented or purchased more equipment through these contracts). 
 168 Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd., at 562.   
 169 See id. at 558.   
 170 Id. at 562 (finding that the claimant could be considered a “qualified merchant” 
because the defendant’s expert opined that the claimant would be regarded as a “qualified 
merchant” under German law and the claimant’s expert did not dispute the proposition). 
 171 Given the court mentioned its consideration of the experts’ opinions repeatedly 
throughout the case, it is possible that the court considered the experts’ opinion on German 
law related to the second interpretive issue.  The court did not cite to any other authority 
in English or other law. 
 172 Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd., at 565.   
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argument was complicated by the fact that the general conditions, 
which were supposed to be attached to the contract of hire, were 
lost.173  The court ultimately found that the defendant did not meet 
its burden to prove the contract of hire included a jurisdiction clause 
pointing to German courts.174  Despite its holding, however, the 
court engaged in an analysis assuming the contract of hire included 
a jurisdiction clause.175  This assumption required the court to 
consider another interpretive question: whether the defendant, as a 
third party to the contract of hire, could invoke the jurisdiction 
clause.176  The defendant argued that it was in fact a party to the 
contract because the subsidiary transferred all of its business to the 
defendant through a transfer agreement, including the contract of 
hire.177  The court examined whether the transfer agreement was 
valid under German law and, more specifically, whether a novation 
(replacing one party to an agreement with a new party) properly 
occurred under German law.  A valid novation would make the 
defendant the lessor in the contract of hire to the claimant.178  The 
court’s discussion of German law was again limited to the expert 
opinions and, while the court did little to explain or elaborate on 
what those opinions were, it stated repeatedly that its findings were 
based on German law.179 
 
 173 See id. at 565–66 (showing that the parties presented factual evidence on what 
general conditions they claim would have been applied to a contract of hire between the 
parties at the time and witnesses from the defendant presented two possible general 
conditions, which could have applied to the contract of hire, both of which included a 
jurisdiction clause pointing to German counts; however, the court was not convinced that 
either of the general conditions could have applied to the contract of hire). 
 174 Id. (placing the burden on the defendant under EU law to prove that the contract 
of hire included a jurisdiction clause, the court found that the “evidence before the court 
falls far short of demonstrating that the hire contract . . . included a German jurisdiction 
clause.”). 
 175 See id. 
 176 Id. at 566 (indicating that the defendant was the parent company of the subsidiary 
and, therefore, not a party to the contract of hire between the subsidiary and the claimant). 
 177 Id. at 566. 
 178 Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd., at 566–68 (reflecting the court’s discussion in its 
analysis of whether or not the claimant was informed and/or consented to the novation, 
based on the facts and that German law required the claimant to be informed of the 
substitution of parties and to have consented to it). 
 179 See id. at 566 (“I am not going to embark upon an analysis of German law.   Suffice 
it to say that I have read the two expert reports and have studied the terms of the transfer 
agreement.”). 
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The court ultimately decided: (1) the statutory claim against the 
defendant was “completely unrelated” to the sale contract, and the 
jurisdiction clause incorporated in the sales contract, therefore, did 
not apply; and (2) there was no jurisdiction clause in the contract of 
hire and, even if there was, the claimant could not invoke such a 
jurisdiction clause as a third party.180 
The second U.K. case example demonstrates how, despite it 
being well-recognized in British courts that the law chosen by the 
parties should be applied to interpret forum selection clauses under 
the same agreement, a court in the United Kingdom may simply 
avoid referring to foreign law even in cases where experts have 
presented evidence on the relevant foreign law.  In this recent case 
before the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court in October 2017, 
the court stated that it was “common ground” that a court must apply 
the law chosen by the parties in the choice-of-law clause to interpret 
the entire agreement, including any potential forum selection clause.  
The court subsequently decided instead to examine the clause under 
English law based on the argument that interpretation of the clause 
under the relevant law chosen by the parties would not produce a 
different result than interpretation under English law.181 
The narrow issue in the 2017 case, Berrocal v. Warner Chappell 
Music Ltd, was whether a provision included in several license 
agreements, when construed according to the law of New York—
the law chosen by the parties—would provide exclusive jurisdiction 
to the courts of New York over disputes relating to those 
agreements.  To answer this question, the court had to first 
determine “whether the clause is just a choice of law clause . . . , or 
whether it is also a forum selection clause.”182  The relevant clause 
in this case, which the court referred to as a 
“construction/enforcement clause,” stated: “This 
[contract/agreement] shall be construed and shall always be subject 
to enforcement pursuant to the laws of the state of New York and of 
 
 180 See id. at 562–63 (explaining that the court’s decision was based on three reasons: 
(1) Both of the claims brought by the plaintiff were related to the defendant’s alleged 
negligence; (2) the alleged negligence took place at least two years before the parties 
entered the sales contract; and (3) the plaintiff was not bringing a claim that relates to the 
breach of the sales contract). 
 181 See Berrocal v. Warner Chappell Music Ltd, Ref. IP-2017000060, 2017 WL 
04393157 (Intell. Prop. Enter. Ct. Oct. 3, 2017). 
 182 Id. 
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the United States of America.”183 
Both sides presented opinions from attorneys in New York 
regarding how a court in New York would interpret the clause at 
issue.184  Interestingly, despite the expert opinions and New York 
authorities cited, the court in the case turned immediately to 
discussing how the issue would be examined under English law, 
based on its view that what matters in such a case is whether the 
relevant foreign law is substantively different than English law.185  
The court stated: 
 
With great respect to both [experts], I am not at all convinced that the 
expert evidence adds anything of substance.  In English terms what I 
would have to decide is what a reader of the construction/enforcement 
clause would reasonably understand the words of that clause to mean.  I 
did not detect from the evidence of Mr[.] Zakarin or Mr[.] Licalsi that 
the New York court would approach construction in a different way.  In 
any event, I take the view that the responsibility of the parties in a case 
such as this is to identify clearly any principle of foreign law on which 
they rely which differs from the relevant principle of English law.  The 
existence of a principle unknown to English law can be either accepted 
or disputed by the opposing side and its relevance and effect debated.  If, 
in the present case, there is no difference between New York and English 
law that matters, no expert evidence is needed.  Alternatively if the court 
is satisfied that differences exist, it is the duty of the court to construe 
the relevant clause or agreement with those differences fully in mind.186 
 
In taking this view, the court asked counsel from each side to 
identify any differences between New York and English law in 
construing the relevant clause.187  The counsel for the defendant 
seeking enforcement of the clause claimed New York courts would 
interpret the clause more literally than English courts, which the 
court did not accept as a difference.188  As a result, the court decided 
to “approach the construction of the clause in the usual manner 
 
 183 Id. 
 184 See id. 
 185 See id. 
 186 Id. 
 187  Berrocal v. Warner Chappell Music Ltd, Ref. IP-2017000060, 2017 WL 
04393157 (Intell. Prop. Enter. Ct. Oct. 3, 2017). 
 188 Id. 
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under English law.”189 
The Berrocal court ultimately decided that the 
“construction/enforcement” clause did not constitute a “forum 
selection procedure clause” and held that the English court had 
jurisdiction.190  Applying the “reasonable reader” test, but without 
citing any English law or cases, the court stated, “I do not accept the 
words of the construction/enforcement clause would drive a 
reasonable reader to interpret them to mean that every conceivable 
aspect [of] enforcement must be decided according to New York 
law.”191 
Confusingly, and despite stating “no expert evidence was 
needed” and that the court would apply the English approach, the 
court in Berrocal discussed one New York case cited by the 
claimant’s expert, Waldorf Ass’ns. Inc. v. Gary J. Nevill, 141 
Misc.2d 150 (1998).192  In Waldorf, that court found the clause at 
issue, which similarly discussed enforcement, to be solely a choice-
of-law provision and to have “nothing to do with choice of forum 
or consent to submit to jurisdiction.”193 
The court’s opinion in Berrocal is noteworthy, not only because 
it is recent and the issue for dismissal was narrow, but also because 
it demonstrates how even in English courts, where it is considered 
to be settled law and “common ground” that the law chosen by the 
parties should be applied to interpret forum selection clauses, judges 
in common law courts can apply tests such as the “difference in law” 
test to essentially get around having to give weight or cite to the law 
chosen by the parties.  The Berrocal court was aware of the general 
principle that the law chosen by the parties should be applied to the 
interpretation of the agreement.  It also had several New York cases 
put before it by New York attorneys, and even decided to cite to a 
New York case that supported its ultimate finding—yet, at the end 
of the day, the court based its decision in English law, as opposed 
 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at *3. 
 191 Id. 
 192 See id. 
 193 See Berrocal, at *3 (citing the New York case, but before applying the English 
“reasonable reader” test, the judge in Berrocal stated: “[I]t is always difficult to draw any 
firm conclusion on construction from particular words or facts about the cases, and that 
difficulty certainly applies in the present case.  Therefore, I return to the straightforward 
question of construction of the relevant provision.”). 
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to New York law. 
III.  Non-EU Countries 
A. Civil Law Countries 
1.  Switzerland194 
Switzerland is a Confederation consisting of twenty-six cantons 
and half-cantons, which essentially operate as states, and 
municipalities, which operate as local authorities within the cantons.  
Each canton often has several courts.  For example, in the canton 
Zurich there are twelve district courts (Bezirksgerichte), a supreme 
court (Obergericht), a commercial court (Handelsgericht), an 
administrative court (Verwaltungsgericht), a construction court 
(Baurekursgericht), a tax court (Steuerrekursgericht), and a social 
security court (sozialversichergungsgericht).195  The Federal 
Supreme Court (Bundesgericht) is the highest court in Switzerland.  
It operates as the court of last instance for appeals against decisions 
of the highest cantonal courts, which include the Federal Criminal 
Court, the Federal Administrative Court, and the Federal Patent 
Court.196 
a. Summary of Relevant Private Law 
The primary source of private international law rules in 
Switzerland comes from the Swiss Private International Law Act 
(“Swiss PILA”), which entered into force on January 1, 1989.197  
 
 194 Research on Swiss law and cases was primarily conducted using SwissLex and 
internet resources publicly available through Swiss governmental organizations or 
authorities.  Although Switzerland has four national languages, including German, French, 
Italian, and Romansh, research for this paper was limited to resources and cases available 
in the German language.  References to Swiss courts, law, and other authorities will 
therefore only be made to the German name for such court, law, or authority. 
 195 Organisation [Organization], GERICHTE ZÜRICH [Zurich Courts], 
http://www.gerichte-zh.ch/organisation/ [https://perma.cc/97DU-F3QB]. 
 196 Swiss Courts, SCHWEIZERISCHE EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT [Swiss Confederation], 
https://www.ch.ch/en/demokratie/federalism/separation-of-powers/switzerlands-courts/ 
[https://perma.cc/8WRF-6AN3]. 
 197 Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht [Swiss Federal Law on 
International Private Law], https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-
compilation/19870312/index.html [https://perma.cc/3PB7-QNAB] [hereinafter Swiss 
PILA].  While no official English translation approved or published by the Swiss 
Government was located by the author of this paper, there are various English translations 
of the Swiss PILA drafted by law firms or legal organizations.  Two examples of such 
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The Swiss PILA provides rules governing the jurisdiction of Swiss 
courts and authorities, as well as the applicable law for international 
matters brought in Switzerland.198  Article 5 of the Swiss PILA 
recognizes the role of jurisdiction clauses, providing that parties 
may agree on a court for existing or future disputes related to a 
specific legal relationship.199  Under Article 5, jurisdiction clauses 
are presumed to be exclusive unless otherwise stated.200  A 
jurisdiction clause may be void if it improperly deprives a party of 
jurisdiction they are entitled to under Swiss law.201  Article 9 of the 
Swiss PILA, like the Brussels I Regulation, provides lis pendens 
rules which require: (1) a Swiss court to stay a proceeding if 
litigation has been initiated elsewhere and the Swiss court expects 
the foreign court to render a decision regarding jurisdiction within 
a reasonable amount of time; and (2) a Swiss court to dismiss the 
action before it if a reputable foreign court decides to accept 
jurisdiction, and such decision can be recognized in Switzerland.202   
Section 3 of the Swiss PILA governs applicable law.  Under 
Article 116, contracts are to be governed by the law chosen by the 
parties.203  Similar to German law, Article 16 of the Swiss PILA 
requires Swiss courts, where relevant, to apply foreign law ex officio 
or on their own initiative.204  The court may request the assistance 
of an expert or, in certain cases, place the burden of proof regarding 
the content of foreign law on the parties.205  If the content of the 
foreign law cannot be determined, Swiss law will apply.206  There 
 
translations: Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private International Law (CPIL), UMBRICHT 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, 
https://www.hse.ru/data/2012/06/08/1252692468/SwissPIL%20%D0%B2%20%D1%80
%D0%B5%D0%B4.%202007%20(%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%BB.).pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5P6Z-4ZAQ]; Andreas Bucher, Federal Act on Private International 
Law, ANDREAS BUCHER, http://www.andreasbucher-
law.ch/images/stories/pil_act_1987_as_from_1_1_2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/TK4J-
UWVP]. 
 198 Swiss PILA, supra note 197, at art. 1(a–b). 
 199 Id. at art. 5(1). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at art. 5(2). 
 202 Id. at art. 5(1,3). 
 203 Id. at art. 116. 
 204 Swiss PILA, supra note 197, at art. 16(1). 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at art. 16(2). 
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are some exceptions to when a choice-of-law clause is enforceable.  
For example, under Article 120, a choice-of-law clause is prohibited 
between parties engaged in consumer contracts.207  Article 17 also 
provides an exception to the application of foreign law if it is 
incompatible with Swiss public policy.208 
International conventions and treaties to which Switzerland is a 
party must also be considered in the applicable law; as such, 
conventions take precedence over national Swiss law according to 
Article 1(2) of the Swiss PILA.209  The most notable of such treaties 
is the previously discussed Lugano Convention, which has played a 
role in several cases before Swiss courts.210 
b. Case Examples211 
The following two Swiss cases—both cases from Switzerland’s 
highest court, the Bundesgericht, heard in 2012 and 2013 
respectively—illustrate how a Swiss court applies the rules from the 
Swiss PILA and international conventions such as the Lugano 
Convention to address issues regarding the enforcement and 
interpretation of jurisdiction clauses.  In both cases, the court is 
consistent in finding how the law chosen by the parties in a valid 
choice-of-law clause should apply to interpretation issues. 
The 2012 case illustrates the insistence of Switzerland’s highest 
court, based on provisions of the Swiss PILA, that a Swiss court 
must apply the law chosen by the parties in a valid choice-of-law 
clause to the interpretation of the scope of a jurisdiction clause as it 
 
 207 Id. at art. 120. 
 208 Id. at art. 17. 
 209 Id. at art. 2(1). 
 210 Because the relevant provisions of the Lugano Convention have already been 
discussed under the previous section on EU law, they will not be repeated here.  See 
Lugano Convention, supra note 38. 
 211 As with Germany, it should be noted that case examples play only a limited role 
in civil law jurisdictions like Switzerland.  Due to the strength of its provisions on choice-
of-law clauses, Swiss law is more particular in answering the question of which law should 
be applied to the interpretation of jurisdiction clauses.  However, there still is no provision 
under the Swiss PILA that directly links the law designated under a valid choice-of-law 
clause to the interpretation of a jurisdiction clause.  Moreover, to exemplify how Swiss 
courts apply the provisions from the Swiss PILA, the examination of case law is still a 
helpful tool.  In describing the relevant applicable law in Switzerland, as was the case with 
Germany, it should be noted that there are not a significant number of Swiss cases that 
address the narrow issue of this paper.  However, a survey of the cases that do exist 
revealed trends which are demonstrated by the case examples described in this section. 
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relates to third parties.212  The plaintiff in the case, located in 
Switzerland, entered a Supply Agreement with “Z,” a Spanish 
company, to supply components of a biodiesel manufacturing 
facility.213  Z was initially purchasing the components for the 
defendant in the case, a company also located in Spain.214  The terms 
and conditions of the Supply Agreement included a jurisdiction 
clause, which indicated that disputes would be heard in a Swiss 
court.215  During the process of the transaction, Z had difficulties 
making payment to the plaintiff, so the three parties (the plaintiff, 
the defendant, and Z) entered into an Assignment Agreement, 
written in English, under which the plaintiff agreed to supply the 
defendant with the components it had previously agreed to supply 
to Z.  The defendant was also required to pay the remaining balance 
under the original contract.216  The Assignment Agreement, signed 
by all three parties, was to “be governed by, and construed in 
accordance with Spanish common law.”217  The Assignment 
Agreement also contained a jurisdiction clause under which all 
disputes related to the interpretation, validity, fulfillment, and 
termination of the agreement were to be heard before the courts of 
“S,” located in Spain.218 
A dispute arose between the parties regarding the defendant’s 
payment, where the plaintiff alleged the defendant did not make full 
payment despite the plaintiff having fully performed under the 
contract.219  The plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against the defendant 
before the Arlesheim district court in Switzerland.220  The defendant 
 
 212 Bundesgericht [BGE] [Federal Supreme Court], July 17, 2012, 4A_177/2012 
[hereinafter 4A_177/2012] (Switz.). 
 213 For redaction purposes, Swiss cases often abbreviate party names and other things, 
such as cities and locations, in cases by letters.  References in this paper to parties or other 
names of individuals or places using letters is done only because the court does not actually 
give a full name in the case. 
 214 4A_177/2012, supra note 212, at ¶ A. 
 215 Id.  The redacted opinion does not quote the actual jurisdiction clause and only 
summarizes the clause to state the terms and conditions indicated; disputes arising from 
the agreement would be heard in “R. ______.”  While the case does not make clear exactly 
what “R” is, it is clear based on the overall context of the case that R is a Swiss court. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at ¶ B. 
 218 Id. at ¶ A. 
 219 Id. at ¶ B. 
 220 4A_177/2012, supra note 212, at ¶ B. 
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disputed the Arlesheim court had jurisdiction to hear the matter 
given the jurisdiction clause between the parties.221  The Arlesheim 
court found that it did have jurisdiction to hear the dispute because 
the rights and duties contained in the terms and conditions of the 
Supply Agreement applied to the defendant as a third party, and the 
heart of the dispute between the parties related to the Supply 
Agreement, over which stated Swiss courts had jurisdiction.222 
The defendant appealed the holding of the Arlesheim Court to 
the Basel Kanton Court (Kantonsgericht Basel-Landschaft) (“Basel 
Court”), which, applying Swiss law, reversed the finding of the 
Arlesheim Court.223  The plaintiff then applied to the Federal 
Supreme Court of Switzerland for relief, requesting the Supreme 
Court overturn the decision of the Basel Court and find that the 
Arlesheim Court had jurisdiction over the dispute.224  The Supreme 
Court addressed the narrow issue of determining which jurisdiction 
clause governed the dispute between the parties.225  The plaintiff 
argued the Basel Court did not consider the interpretation rules and 
commentary (“Auslegungsregeln”) that exists in Article 18 and 
thereby violated federal Swiss law.226  The defendant argued that the 
interpretation of the Assignment Agreement, including its 
jurisdiction clause, was governed by Spanish law—not Swiss law—
based on the choice-of-law clause in the Assignment Agreement, 
which both parties agreed to.227 
Instead of basing its decision on Article 17 of the Lugano 
 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. (referencing that the Arlesheim court also opined that the jurisdiction clause 
from the Assignment Agreement did not render the jurisdiction clause from the Supply 
Agreement obsolete). 
 223 Id.  The Basel Court applied Swiss Law, specifically Article 18 of the Swiss Code 
of Obligations (das Schweizerische Obligationenrecht or “OR”), which states that 
assessments and interpretations of the form and content of contracts should be done 
according to the parties’ intent and not according to the text of the contract, which can be 
misleading or misused by the parties.  Based on Article 18, the Basel Court found that the 
parties intended for the jurisdiction clause of the Assignment Agreement to derogate the 
jurisdiction clause of the Supply Agreement, and the Arlesheim District court therefore 
did not have jurisdiction over the dispute.  Id. at ¶ 3.1.  The Swiss OR is available at 
https://or.gesetzestext.ch/artikel.cfm?key=19&art=Die_Entstehung_der_Obligationen 
[https://perma.cc/XAR6-9EF3]. 
 224 Id. at ¶ C. 
 225 4A_177/2012, supra note 212, at ¶ 3.1. 
 226 4A_177/2012, supra note 212, at ¶ 3.2. 
 227 Id. at ¶ 3.2. 
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Convention, the Swiss Supreme Court based its decision on the 
principle of lex causae.228  The Supreme Court sent the case back to 
the Basel Court, holding that the interpretation of the Assignment 
Clause was not to be done by Swiss law, but according to Spanish 
law.229  The Supreme Court further advised that, according to Article 
16 of the Swiss PILA, the Basel Court can either determine the 
content of Spanish law itself or require the parties to submit 
evidence regarding the content of Spanish law.230 
Turning to the 2013 Swiss case, the plaintiff in that case was a 
public company located in Switzerland that provided services in the 
airline industry.231  The defendant was a German limited liability 
company (GmbH) seated in Germany that provided software.232  
The defendant was to provide the plaintiff with software under an 
End User License Agreement (“EULA”) and a Master Services 
Agreement (“MSA”), but the plaintiff claimed the defendant did not 
deliver and install the software as agreed upon.233  The plaintiff 
initially filed a lawsuit against the defendant in the Commercial 
Court of Zurich.234  The Zurich court held it did not have jurisdiction 
over the matter because there was no valid jurisdiction clause, and 
private international law rules held jurisdiction would be at the seat 
of the defendant in Germany.235  The plaintiff then appealed the 
Zurich court’s decision to the Swiss Bundesgericht, or the Federal 
Supreme Court of Switzerland.236 
On appeal, the parties disagreed as to which jurisdiction clause 
 
 228 Lex causae refers to the system of law applicable to the case in dispute.   Lex 
causae, OXFORD REFERENCE, 
,http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100103308 
[https://perma.cc/MUU9-XM9A] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).  The Supreme Court faced 
difficulties because the Lugano Convention was not yet applicable when the parties 
entered into the agreement, so the Convention did not apply. 4A_177/2012, supra note 
212, at ¶ 3.3. 
 229 The court cited the Swiss case Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] 128 
III 346 E. 3.3 S. 352 (Switz.). 
 230 4A_177/2012, supra note 212, at ¶ 3.4. 
 231 Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] July 31, 2013, 4A_149/2013 
SWISSLEX ¶ A (Switz.). 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. at ¶ B. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. at ¶ C. 
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governed their relationship.  The plaintiff claimed a jurisdiction 
clause in the supplement to the EULA and the MSA gave 
jurisdiction to courts in Zurich.  The defendant claimed the clause 
in the original EULA, which stated jurisdiction was in Germany, 
governed.237  In its decision, the Supreme Court stated the issue of 
whether a jurisdiction agreement governed the relationship of the 
parties had to be judged “autonomously.”  In addition, any 
jurisdiction clause must be interpreted using the law chosen by the 
parties in their choice-of-law clause, which in this case was German 
law.238  Citing to more than ten German cases, the Court held that 
according to German law, the dispute must be judged based on the 
intent of the parties.  The Court further stated it was not certain 
under German law that both parties had the intent to change 
jurisdiction from Germany to Switzerland, and ultimately rejected 
the appeal.239 
 
 237 Bundesgericht, at ¶ 3.2.  The jurisdiction agreement in the EULA, written in 
English, stated, “This Agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with the 
laws of Germany, exclusive of its conflicts of law provisions and the Parties hereby submit 
to exclusive jurisdiction of the German courts.  The Parties hereto expressly waive the 
application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods to the terms of this Agreement.”  Id. at ¶ 3.2.  The clause in the Supplement to the 
EULA stated in English “Clause 15 (h) - the existing clause shall be renumbered as clause 
15 (i).  In addition, the first sentence of this clause shall be replaced by “Venue for this 
Agreement will be the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland.”  Id.  The MSA also stated 
jurisdiction was in Zurich in its jurisdiction clause, which stated in English, “This 
Agreement, and each Statement of Work entered into in connection herewith, shall be 
governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of Germany, exclusive of its 
conflict of laws provisions, and the Parties hereby submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the ordinary courts of the Canton of Zurich, Switzerland, in relation to any disputes and 
claims arising out of or related to this Agreement.  The Parties hereto expressly waive the 
application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods to the terms of this Agreement.”  Id. 
 238 Id. at ¶ 4. 
 239 Id. at ¶¶ 4.1, 5.  The court went on to discuss what country would have jurisdiction 
under the Lugano Convention, which it also determined to be Germany.  Under the Lugano 
Convention, given the contracts did not specify a place of delivery, the place of delivery 
under the Lugano Convention is at the location of the debtor, in this case the defendant, 
and thus jurisdiction would be in Germany.  The plaintiff argued the place of delivery was 
where the software was to be installed, and jurisdiction would therefore be in Switzerland.  
Bundesgericht, at ¶ 5.1.  However, the court disagreed, holding that software is not a 
physical item and therefore does not have a place of delivery, citing to cases under E.U. 
law and the Lugano Convention.  Id. at ¶ 5.4.1. 
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B. Common Law Countries 
1. Australia240 
A brief description of the hierarchy of Australian courts is 
helpful from the outset.  In Australia, the courts are divided between 
state courts and federal courts.241  The Local and Magistrate courts 
of the states are the lowest courts; they hear minor disputes and 
criminal cases before a magistrate.242  The District and County 
courts compose the next highest level.243  Cases before these courts 
are heard by a judge and typically entail criminal cases and appeals 
from the Local and Magistrate courts.244  The Supreme Court is the 
highest court in each State or Territory.245  These courts hear very 
serious criminal matters and appeals based on law or fact from 
lower courts.246  The Supreme Courts may have special divisions 
which hear certain cases on appeal, such as a special division for 
criminal cases.247  The Federal Courts of Australia hear civil and 
criminal matters that fall under federal law.248  Finally, the High 
Court in Australia is the highest court in the country.  It not only has 
original jurisdiction for all matters concerning the Australian 
Constitution, but is also the court of last resort for hearing appeals 
based on questions of law from the state and territory courts for 
criminal and civil cases.249 
a. Summary of Relevant Law 
Up until 1997, and particularly following the decision of the 
Australian High Court in Akai v. People’s Insurance Co., 188 CLR 
418 (1996), Australian courts were overall “unsupportive” in their 
 
 240 Research on Australian law and cases was primarily conducted using Westlaw 
International, the Australasian Legal Information Institute (AustLII), and LexisNexis 
Academic. 
 241 The courts, AUSTL. GOV’T ATT’Y-GEN.’S DEP’T, 
https://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/Courts/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/KB2V-
5M2F] [hereinafter The courts]. 
 242 See id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
 247 The courts, supra note 241. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
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approach to interpreting and enforcing jurisdiction clauses.250  
Courts at the time tended to interpret jurisdiction clauses as meaning 
non-exclusive rather than exclusive.251  Even when courts found a 
jurisdiction clause to be exclusive, “there was an excessive 
inclination to allow factors of convenience to preclude 
enforcement” of such clauses, as well as a “willingness to allow 
Australian plaintiffs to circumvent such clauses by pleading 
breaches of Australian statutes.”252 
Since 1997, Australian courts have been more likely to find 
jurisdiction clauses to be exclusive in scope than before.  The 
Supreme Court of New South Wales expressed several guiding 
principles for determining whether a jurisdiction clause is exclusive 
in Ace Insurance v. Moose Enterprise:253 
 
First, while absence of the word “exclusive” is not determinative, the 
distinction between an exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction clause 
is sufficiently well-known, and the facility of making the clause 
manifestly an exclusive jurisdiction clause so straightforward, that its 
absence is not merely neutral but tends against the clause being an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause.  Secondly, where the courts of the selected 
forum would have jurisdiction in any event, that tells in favour of a 
clause being an exclusive jurisdiction clause; a fortiori where they would 
be the “natural forum.”  Thirdly, the suggested exception in respect of 
insurance policies is not well supported by the authorities, save that in 
the case of ambiguity the court will more readily incline to a construction 
that favours the insured.  Fourthly, use of words such as “all” or “any” 
disputes, and mandatory words such as “shall,” tell in favour of a clause 
being an exclusive jurisdiction clause.254 
 
 250 Richard Garnett, Jurisdiction Clauses since Akai, (2013) UMelbLRS 6 § I 
[hereinafter Jurisdiction Clauses since Akai].  See Richard Garnett, The Enforcement of 
Jurisdiction Clauses in Australia, 21 UNSW L.J. 1, 2 (1998). 
 251 Garnett, Jurisdiction Clauses since Akai, supra note 250, § I. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. at § II(A)(1) (discussing Ace Ins. Ltd. v. Moose Enter. Ltd. [2009] NSWSC 724 
¶ 33 (Austl.)). 
 254 Ace Ins. v. Moose Enter. [2009] NSWSC 724 ¶ 33 (Austl.).  The Ace Insurance 
case involved a prorogation clause, which is a clause that designates the courts of the forum 
to have jurisdiction.  Garnett, Jurisdiction Clauses since Akai, supra note 250, at § 
II(A)(1).  Australian courts are more likely to find such clauses to be exclusive.  See id.  
However, the principles identified in Ace Insurance have also been applied to cases with 
foreign jurisdiction clauses.  See id. at § II(A)(2); AAP Indus. Party Ltd. v Rehau Pte. Ltd. 
[2015] NSWSC 468 ¶ 15 (Austl.). 
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These principles were taken from English and Australian 
cases.255 
Where a jurisdiction clause is found to be an exclusive 
jurisdiction clause, Australian courts give strong deference to the 
agreement between the parties.256  When an exclusive jurisdiction 
clause is before the court, “the starting point is that the parties 
should be held to their bargain, and while [a] Court retains its 
jurisdiction and may decline to grant a stay of proceedings 
substantial grounds for doing so are required.”257  To determine 
whether such substantial grounds exist, Australian courts follow 
four principles that were adopted from English common law. These 
principles include: (1) The court is not bound to grant a stay but has 
a discretion whether to do so or not; (2) the discretion should be 
exercised by granting a stay unless strong cause for not doing so is 
shown; (3) the burden of proving such a strong cause is on the 
plaintiff; and (4) in exercising its discretion the court should take 
into account all the circumstances of the particular case.258 
Analysis regarding whether a jurisdiction clause should be 
enforced “is not to be assimilated to cases where a stay is sought on 
the principle of forum non conveniens, nor is it a matter of mere 
convenience.”259  Unlike with the issue of exclusivity, it was “well 
established” that Australian courts apply the law governing the 
contract when interpreting the scope of a jurisdiction clause, 
including interpretation of the scope and whether the clause applies 
to non-signatories.260 
b. Case Examples 
Two case examples are provided below.  The first case 
illustrates how an Australian court applies the law chosen by the 
parties to interpret an exclusive jurisdiction clause.  The second 
case, however, suggests that Australian courts, similar to other 
 
 255 Id. at ¶¶ 15–33. 
 256 See id. at ¶¶ 15–40. 
 257 FAI Gen. Ins. v. Ocean Marine Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n [1997] 41 NSWLR 
559, 569 (Austl.). 
 258 Gonzalez v Agoda Co. Pte. Ltd. [2017] NSWSC 1133 ¶ 34 (Austl.). 
 259 Glob. Partners Fund v. Babcock & Brown [2010] NSWSC 270 ¶ 118 (Austl.) 
(citing English and Australian cases as authority). 
 260 Jurisdiction Clauses since Akai, supra note 250, at § II(B). 
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common law jurisdictions, are not likely to apply foreign law ex 
officio to the interpretation of a forum selection clause. 
In Global Partners Fund v. Babcock & Brown, the court, despite 
having already decided to dismiss the case on other grounds, went 
into an in-depth discussion on the interpretation and application of 
the exclusive jurisdiction clause together with the choice-of-law 
clause.261  The joint jurisdiction and choice-of-law clause in this case 
read: 
 
18.11 Governing Law This Agreement and the rights, obligations and 
relationships of the parties hereto under this Agreement and in respect 
of the Private Placement Memorandum shall be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the laws of England and all the parties 
irrevocably agree that the courts of England are to have exclusive 
jurisdiction to settle any disputes which may arise out of or in connection 
with this Agreement or the Private Placement Memorandum or the 
acquisition of Commitments, whether or not governed by the laws of 
England, and that accordingly any suit, action or proceedings arising out 
of or in connection with this Agreement or the Private Placement 
Memorandum or the acquisition of Commitments shall be brought in 
such courts.  The parties hereby waive, to the extent not prohibited by 
applicable law, and agree not to assert by way of motion, as a defense or 
otherwise, in any such proceeding, any claim that it is not subject 
personally to the jurisdiction of such courts, that any such proceeding 
brought in such courts is improper or that this Agreement or the Private 
Placement Memorandum, or the subject matter hereof or thereof, may 
not be enforced in or by such court.262 
 
The parties disagreed about the scope of this exclusive 
jurisdiction clause, particularly about whether or not the clause 
applied to third parties.263  In discussing its interpretation of the 
scope of the clause, the court relied on English case law, noting that 
“[t]he proper construction of cl. 18.11 of the Partnership Agreement 
 
 261 Glob. Partners Fund, [2010] NSWSC 270 at ¶¶ 97, 117–134.  The claimant in the 
case was a partnership which, together with other parties, invested in the acquisition of an 
indirect equity stake in a company incorporated in Delaware.  Id. at ¶ 22.  The investment 
turned out to be unsuccessful, so the claimant brought claims against the defendant 
advisors who handled negotiations for the acquisition, alleging the defendants failed to act 
in the claimant’s interests, breaching their fiduciary duty of care.  Id. at ¶ 45. 
 262 Id. at Schedule A ¶ 18.11. 
 263 Id. at ¶¶ 123, 126. 
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is a matter for the proper law of the contract, in this case the law of 
England.”264  To support its contention that terms such as “arising 
out of” or “in connection with” should be interpreted broadly, the 
court cited at length to the previously discussed English case Fiona 
Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov.265  The court also cited the 
previously discussed English case Donohue v. Armco in support of 
its finding that the clause applied to third parties.266 
However, despite it being “well established” that the law of the 
contract governs the interpretation of exclusive jurisdiction clauses, 
similar to courts in the United Kingdom, Australian courts are not 
likely to consider foreign law ex officio, or seek out foreign law, if 
the parties did not present evidence on such foreign law.267  This is 
illustrated by a recent case decided in August 2017, discussed 
below. 
In Gonzalez v. Agoda Co. the plaintiff filed a personal injury 
claim for injuries sustained when she slipped and fell outside of the 
shower at a hotel she was staying at in Paris.268  The plaintiff filed a 
claim against the company through which she had booked the hotel 
online in Australia.269  The defendant, a company incorporated in 
Singapore, included standard terms and conditions of booking in 
their “Payment Details Page.”  The plaintiff was required to agree 
to those terms before proceeding with her online booking.270  The 
defendant’s terms and conditions included an exclusive jurisdiction 
and choice-of-law clause which stated: 
 
The Terms and the provision of our services shall be governed by and 
construed in accordance with the laws of Singapore without reference to 
Singapore conflict of laws rules, and any dispute arising out of the Terms 
and our services shall exclusively be submitted to the competent courts 
 
 264 Id. at ¶ 119. 
 265 Glob. Partners Fund, at ¶ 120. 
 266 Id. at ¶ 123. 
 267 See Gonzalez v Agoda Co.2017] NSWSC 1133 (Austl.). 
 268 Gonzalez [2017] NSWSC 1133 ¶¶ 6, 18, 24. 
 269 Id. at ¶¶ 3–16, 24–26. 
 270 Id. at ¶¶ 4–14.  The plaintiff was not required to check any box indicating that she 
agreed with the standard terms and conditions.  The text, “I Agree with the booking 
conditions and general terms by booking this room . . . [,]” appeared above the button with 
the text “book now,” which the plaintiff had to click in order to process the booking.  Id. 
at ¶¶ 13–15. 
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in Singapore.  The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act (Cap. 53B) is 
expressly excluded and shall not apply to the Terms.271 
 
The plaintiff argued the defendant “was required to exercise due 
care and skill in its provision . . . of a hotel room of appropriate 
quality” under Australian consumer protection laws.272  The 
defendant argued the proceedings in Australia should be stayed or 
dismissed due to the exclusive jurisdiction clause.273 
The Gonzalez court addressed whether the exclusive jurisdiction 
clause was incorporated into the contract.274  Despite the court 
stating multiple times that the law of Singapore governed the 
contract, the court applied a test from Australian case law that 
provides for an objective analysis of the contractual intentions of 
the parties.  It ultimately determined the exclusive jurisdiction 
clause was incorporated into the contract.275  The court discussed at 
length the forum non conveniens arguments that were presented by 
both parties, and even set forth alternative findings.  Despite such a 
thorough opinion insisting that the law of Singapore governed the 
contract, the court did not discuss or cite a single case from 
Singapore to determine whether under Singapore law the exclusive 
jurisdiction clause would be incorporated into the contract.  There 
was also no indication in the opinion that the parties hired experts 
or put forth arguments under Singapore law. 
2. Canada 
Canada, a country made up of ten provinces and three territories, 
has three overall levels of government including the municipal, 
provincial or territorial, and federal levels.276  The judicial system is 
divided between federal and provincial or territorial jurisdictions.277  
 
 271 Id. at ¶ 11.  Reference to the Contracts (Right of Third Parties) Act refers to a 
statute in Singapore.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
 272 Gonzalez, at ¶ 25. 
 273 Id. at ¶ 35–36. 
 274 Id. at ¶ 70. 
 275 Id. at ¶ 118–22. 
 276 Government, GOV’T OF CAN. (July 24, 2017), 
https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/new-
immigrants/learn-about-canada/governement.html [https://perma.cc/Q5GT-62UA]. 
 277 The Judicial Structure, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 16, 2017), 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/just/07.html [https://perma.cc/V55Y-MWQX] 
[hereinafter The Judicial Structure]. 
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Each province has its own provincial courts and administrative 
tribunals which are responsible for both criminal and civil 
matters.278  Furthermore, each province, with the exception of 
Nunavut, has three levels of courts, including provincial or 
territorial courts, superior courts, and appeal courts.279  The superior 
trial courts of a province hear both civil and criminal cases.280  The 
Courts of Appeal in each province hear civil and criminal appeals 
from the superior trial courts.281  On the federal level, there are three 
main lower level civil courts including the Federal Court, which 
hears cases involving federal law, the Federal Court of Appeal, 
which hears appeals from the Federal Court and other tribunals, and 
the Tax Court.282  The Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court 
in Canada and, similar to the United States, is made up of nine 
justices.283  The role of the Supreme Court is to hear appeals from 
the Federal Court of Appeal and the appellate courts in the 
provinces and territories, to decide constitutional issues, and to 
provide an opinion on important legal questions or issues regarding 
“complicated areas of private and public law.”284 
a. Summary of Relevant Law 
In Canada, forum selection clauses are “generally to be 
encouraged by the courts as they create certainty and security in 
transaction, derivatives of order and fairness, which are critical 
components of private international law.”285  Where there is a forum 
selection clause, courts in Canada are to follow the two-step test 
(often referred to as the “Pompey test”) outlined by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the 2003 case, Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-
Line N.V.286  Under the Pompey test, where no legislation overrides 
the forum selection clause, two requirements must be met: (1) the 
 
 278 Id. 
 279 Id. (noting the Nunavut court is only made up of the trial level court). 
 280 Id. (noting such superior courts may go by different names depending on the 
province, such as the Supreme Court, the Court of Queen’s Bench, or the Superior Court 
of Justice). 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. 
 283 The Judicial Structure, supra note 277. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V., 2003 SCC 27, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 450, 463 
(Can.). 
 286 See id. 
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party seeking to stay the action based on enforcement of the forum 
selection clause must establish that the clause is valid, clear, and 
enforceable, and that it applies to the cause of action; and (2) the 
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show “strong cause” why the 
forum selection clause should not be enforced.287  Unlike in 
European jurisdictions, Canadian courts do not apply a presumption 
that forum selection clauses are exclusive unless otherwise 
indicated.288 
An overall review of Canadian case law indicates that Canadian 
courts are not particularly likely to consult foreign law when 
interpreting a forum selection clause, regardless of whether it is the 
law chosen by the parties to govern their agreement.  Canadian 
courts are instead more likely to engage in a thorough conflict of 
laws analysis, including evaluations under the “real and substantial 
connection” test and/or forum non conveniens doctrine.  This is so 
even in cases where there exists a clearly binding forum selection 
clause between the parties.  Interestingly, the law in Canada 
provides the courts with an immense amount of discretion as to what 
type and how deep of an analysis to engage in depending on the 
case.  When a court is met with a case where the parties have agreed 
to a binding forum selection clause, it seems Canadian courts can 
choose between or combine several paths in discussing the 
enforcement and interpretation of the clause.  The courts can include 
analyses under statutory factors, common law tests, such as the real 
and substantial connection or forum non conveniens tests, or the 
court can simply base its decision on the burden of proof under the 
strong cause test.  The extent to which the courts lean on each of 
these options notably varies. 
Some provinces in Canada, such as British Columbia, have 
enacted statutes to guide jurisdiction issues and to effectively codify 
the forum non conveniens test.  British Columbia’s statute, the Court 
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (“CJPTA”), requires a 
 
 287 See Expedition Helicopters Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 2010 ONCA 351, 100 O.R. 3d 
241, ¶¶ 6–9 (Can. Ont. C.A.).  “The ‘strong cause’ test remains relevant and effective and 
no social, moral or economic changes justify . . . departure [from it.]”  Z.I. Pompey, 2003 
SCC 27 at 463.  When necessary, the test “provides sufficient leeway for judges to take 
improper motives into consideration in relevant cases and prevent defendants from relying 
on forum selection clauses to gain an unfair procedural advantage.”  Id. 
 288 Old N. State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Servs., 1998 CanLII 6512, ¶ 35 (Can. B.C. 
C.A.) (“An ambiguous choice of jurisdiction clause will not be construed to grant exclusive 
jurisdiction.”). 
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court to consider a number of factors in deciding whether to decline 
to exercise jurisdiction.  These include: (1) “the comparative 
convenience and expense for the parties . . . and . . . witnesses[;]” 
(2) the applicable law to issues in the proceeding; (3) “the 
desirability of avoiding multiplicity of legal proceedings[;]” (4) “the 
desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions in different courts[;]” 
(5) “the enforcement of an eventual judgment[;]” and (6) “the fair 
and efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a whole.”289  
In describing the role of this statute in relation to cases where a stay 
of proceedings is sought based on a forum selection clause between 
the parties, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, quoting the 
Supreme Court of Canada, stated: 
 
The CJPTA creates a comprehensive regime that applies to all cases 
where a stay of proceedings is sought on the ground that the action 
should be pursued in a different jurisdiction (forum non conveniens).  It 
requires that in every case, including cases where a foreign judge has 
asserted jurisdiction in parallel proceedings, all the relevant factors listed 
in s. 11 be considered in order to determine if a stay of proceedings is 
warranted.290 
 
However, “[i]t will not be necessary in all cases to first 
determine whether there is territorial competence because it may be 
clear that the forum selection clause will govern the outcome of the 
matter.”291  Notably, “[t]he existence of a forum selection clause 
can, by itself, be sufficient reason for a court to decline jurisdiction, 
and it is not simply one of the factors to consider in making a 
determination under [section 11].”292 
The analysis for a court’s approach to an application for a stay 
of proceedings due to a forum selection clause has been 
distinguished in some Canadian courts from analysis under the 
forum non conveniens doctrine.  With regard to this distinction, the 
Pompey Court, quoting a law journal article, stated: 
 
 
 289 Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 28, s. 11 (Can.).  
The CJPTA was based off the model law drafted by the Uniform Law Conference of 
Canada. 
 290 Preymann v. Ayus Tech. Corp., 2012 BCCA 30, ¶ 29 (Can. B.C. C.A.). 
 291 Id. at ¶ 33. 
 292 Id. 
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I am not convinced that a unified approach to forum non 
conveniens, where a choice of jurisdiction clause constitutes but 
one factor to be considered, is preferable . . . I fear that such an 
approach would not ‘ensure that full weight is given to the 
jurisdiction clause since not only should the clause itself be taken 
into account, but also the effect which it has on the factors which 
are relevant to the determination of the natural forum.  Factors 
which may otherwise be decisive may be less so if one takes into 
account that the parties agreed in advance to a hearing in a 
particular forum and must be deemed to have done so fully aware 
of the consequences which that might have on, for example, the 
transportation of witnesses and evidence, or compliance with 
foreign procedure etc.293 
 
Moreover, if a court concludes strong cause has not been shown 
by the party opposing the enforcement of the jurisdiction clause, 
then “it is not necessary to consider whether the action has a ‘real 
and substantial connection’ to the domestic forum.”294  Hence, as 
mentioned previously, Canadian courts have a great deal of 
discretion with regard to which tests they want to apply to consider 
the enforceability and interpretation of a jurisdiction clause. 
b. Case Examples 
As previously stated, Canadian courts apply Canadian case law, 
instead of any foreign law chosen by the parties in a choice-of-law 
clause, to determine both enforcement and interpretation issues 
related to forum selection clauses.295  Two case examples are 
 
 293 Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V., 2003 SCC 27, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 450, 464 
(Can.). 
 294 6463908 Canada Ltd. (c.o.b. ECL Telecom) v. BellSouth Affiliate Servs. Corp., 
2006 CanLII 40990, ¶ 13 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct.). 
 295 See Harrowand S.I. v. Dewind Turbines Ltd., 2014 ONSC 2014, ¶101 (Can. Ont. 
Super. Ct.) (citing to Canadian case law to find choice-of-law and forum selection 
provisions were not binding on the third-party plaintiff and separately that the conveyance 
action did not fit within the scope of the choice-of-law and forum clauses).  See also 
Instrument Concepts-Sensor Software Inc. v. Geokinetics Acquisition Co., 2012 NSSC 62, 
¶¶ 30–39 (Can. Sup. Ct. N.S.) (citing solely to Canadian case law despite a Texas choice-
of-law clause to find a dispute regarding a settlement agreement between the parties fell 
within the scope of a forum selection clause in the original agreement between the parties 
which pointed to Texas courts); Preymann, 2012 BCCA at ¶¶ 25–26 (citing to a British 
Columbia case instead of applying chosen Austrian law to the interpretation of a disputed 
translation of a forum selection clause selecting Austrian courts to determine whether it 
was exclusive or mandatory); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 2008 
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provided to illustrate this.  First, a 2006 case demonstrates a 
Canadian court’s citation to Canadian case law, even where the 
court found the forum selection clause to be exclusive.  A more 
recent case from the Canadian Supreme Court then illustrates the 
court’s use of Canadian case law to decide on the enforcement of a 
forum selection clause and further demonstrates how the highest 
court in Canada is currently thinking about such issues. 
The 2006 case, 6463908 Canada Ltd. (c.o.b. ECL Telecom) v. 
BellSouth Affiliate Services Corp., shows how a Canadian court will 
simply apply its own case law to all issues of enforcement or 
interpretation of forum selection clauses, even when there is a 
choice-of-law clause pointing to the application of foreign law.296  
The plaintiff in that case was a Canadian corporation headquartered 
in Ontario called ECL Telecom (“ECL”) that provided 
telecommunication and personnel services.  In November 2005, the 
plaintiff entered into a services agreement with the defendant, 
BellSouth Affiliate Services Corporation (“BellSouth Affiliate”), to 
provide services to repair telecommunications equipment located in 
Florida, Georgia, and Alabama that had been damaged by hurricane 
weather.297  “Pursuant to a work order from BellSouth Affiliate, 
ECL entered into service agreements . . . with 20 technicians and 
supervisors (the “Individual Defendants”) to provide services under 
its agreement with BellSouth Affiliate.”298  These services 
agreements between BellSouth Affiliate and the Individual 
Defendants included Confidentiality and Non-Compete 
Agreements.299 
After two months of working under contract with ECL, the 
Individual Defendants resigned from their employment with ECL 
and immediately started working for another company, ITC Service 
 
MBQB 112, ¶¶ 45–49 (Can. Man. Q.B.) (citing a case from the Supreme Court of Canada, 
as opposed to the chosen English law, to hold a forum selection clause pointing to English 
courts did not apply to a third party and further that a contribution claim was an equity 
claim and therefore did not fit within the scope of the forum selection clause, and citing to 
English law only within a forum non conveniens analysis unrelated to the forum selection 
clause); Hayes v. Peer 1 Network Inc., 2007 CanLII 245,  ¶¶ 39–50 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct.) 
(deciding a forum selection and choice-of-law clause pointing to Washington, USA courts 
was non-exclusive based on citing to Canadian case law). 
 296 See generally 6463908 Canada Ltd. (c.o.b. ECL Telecom), 2006 CanLII 40990. 
 297 Id. at ¶ 1. 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. 
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Group, Inc. (“ITC”).  ITC provided similar telecommunication and 
personnel services and was also a defendant in the case.300  The 
Individual Defendants were still working for BellSouth Affiliate, 
albeit through ITC instead of through ECL.301  ECL filed a claim in 
Ontario against the Individual Defendants, ITC, BellSouth 
Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth Affiliate for “conspiracy 
to induce breach of contract and interfere in the contractual relations 
between ECL and BellSouth Affiliate and between ECL and the 
Individual Defendants.”302  The defendants moved for an order 
staying the action “on the basis that Ontario is not the appropriate 
forum.”303 
The Services Agreement between BellSouth Affiliate and ECL 
contained a combined choice-of-law and jurisdiction clause, which 
stated: 
The laws of the State of Georgia, U.S.A., without regard to its choice of 
law provisions, shall govern the validity, construction, interpretation and 
performance of this Agreement.  Each Party irrevocably agrees that 
jurisdiction and venue for any proceedings involving this Agreement 
shall be in the appropriate state or federal court in Fulton County, 
Georgia, U.S.A.  Seller [defined in the preamble to the agreement as 
ECL Telecom, an Ontario corporation] hereby irrevocably (a) consents 
to the jurisdiction and venue of the courts of the State of Georgia, 
U.S.A., including federal and state courts located therein, in any action 
arising under or relating to this Agreement, and (b) waives any and all 
jurisdictional defenses including, but not limited to, forum non 
conveniens that Seller may have to the institution of any such action in 
any such court.304 
 
The services agreements between ECL and the Individual 
Defendants included a clause which stated, “[t]his Agreement shall 
be construed in accordance with the statutes and legal decisions of 
the province of Employee’s assignment.”305  Finally, the 
Confidentiality and Non-Compete Agreements between ECL and 
the Individual Defendants also had a choice-of-law clause which 
 
 300 Id. at ¶ 2. 
 301 Id. at ¶ 2. 
 302 6463908 Canada Ltd.  Supra note 296 at ¶ 2. 
 303 Id. at ¶ 3. 
 304 Id. at ¶ 6 (emphasis omitted). 
 305 Id. at ¶ 7 (emphasis omitted). 
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stated the agreement “shall be governed and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Florida without regard to 
its choice of law provisions.”306 
The court first held, citing Pompey, that the forum selection 
clause in the services agreement between ECL and Bellsouth 
choosing Georgia law and courts enforceable for contract actions.307  
With regard to whether the forum selection clause was broad 
enough to include related tort claims, the court also cited to 
Canadian case law, stating: 
 
If the language of the contractual forum selection clause is sufficiently 
broad, extending for example to “any dispute or difference of any kind 
in connection with or arising out of the Contract or the carrying out of 
the Works [as defined in the contract],” the forum selection clause will 
also apply to related tort claims.308 
 
Based on this Canadian case law and further noting it would be 
“incongruous” to require a contract action to be tried in Georgia and 
allow tort claims to be tried in Ontario, the court interpreted the 
forum selection clause between ECL and Bellsouth to include both 
the contract and tort claims before the court.309  In doing so, the court 
did not refer to any Georgia law.310 
Another case from Canada also demonstrates Canadian courts’ 
consistency in focusing on its own tests and case law to determine 
whether to enforce and how to interpret a forum selection clause.  A 
case against Facebook in 2017 heard by the Supreme Court of 
Canada has gained publicity and raised questions regarding the 
enforceability of forum selection clauses in adhesion contracts 
where one party is a consumer.311  The plaintiff in the case, a resident 
of British Columbia, brought a claim against Facebook, a company 
 
 306 Id. at ¶ 8 (emphasis omitted). 
 307 Id. at ¶16. 
 308 6463908 Canada Ltd., supra note 296 at ¶ 13. 
 309 Id. at ¶ 18. 
 310 Id.  With regard to the clauses in the service agreements and the confidentiality 
and non-compete agreements between ECL and the individual defendants, the court found 
that both clauses were choice-of-law clauses and not forum selection clauses, and 
considered such clauses only with regard to the “real and substantial connection” test and 
the forum non conveniens analysis.  Id. at ¶ 19–20. 
 311 See generally Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751 (Can.). 
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headquartered in California, alleging Facebook “used her name and 
likeness without consent for the purposes of advertising, in 
contravention to s. 3(2) of [British Columbia’s] Privacy Act.”312  
Facebook filed a motion to stay the action based on the enforcement 
of a forum selection and choice-of-law clause contained in 
Facebook’s terms of use, which each Facebook user must agree to 
prior to being permitted to use the website.313  The clause read: 
 
You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute (claim) you have 
with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or Facebook 
exclusively in a state or federal court located in Santa Clara County.  The 
laws of the State of California will govern this Statement, as well as any 
claim that might arise between you and us, without regard to conflict of 
law provisions.  You agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the 
courts located in Santa Clara County, California for purpose of litigating 
all such claims.314 
 
The Court was split 3-1-3 on the decision, ultimately holding 
the forum selection clause was not enforceable because the plaintiff 
was able to show strong cause under the second step of the Pompey 
test as to why the clause should not be enforced.315  The plaintiff’s 
arguments not to enforce the forum selection clause included factors 
such as the “convenience of the parties, fairness between the parties 
and the interests of justice.”316  The court in the majority opinion did 
not cite California law in deciding whether the claim brought by the 
plaintiff fell within the scope of the clause, despite Facebook’s 
argument that California courts could theoretically apply the law 
under the British Columbian or Canadian Privacy Act.317 
 
 312 Id. at ¶ 7.  The case was also proposed as a class action lawsuit with a request for 
class certification being included in the case.  Id.  The estimated size of the class was 1.8 
million people.  Id. 
 313 Id. at ¶¶ 8–9. 
 314 Id. at ¶ 8. 
 315 Douez, 2017 SCC 33, supra note 311 at ¶ 76.  The concurring justice agreed with 
the ultimate finding of the court that the forum selection clause was not enforceable, but 
held the opinion that the clause was invalid under the first step of the Pompey test: it was 
invalid under the doctrine of unconscionability due to inequality in the bargaining power 
between the parties and the inherent unfairness of having a consumer travel to California 
to sue a large corporation.  Id. at ¶ 112. 
 316 Id. at ¶¶ 49–50. 
 317 Id. at ¶ 165.  However, it was noted in the dissenting opinion the plaintiff “did not 
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By contrast, the dissenting justices opined the forum selection 
clause should be held valid and enforceable under the “strong 
cause” test.  They emphasized strong public policy factors that 
supported upholding the agreement between the parties, including 
the principles of consistency and predictability in contract 
making.318  Notably, the dissenting justices opined the British 
Columbia legislature had not used clear language to adopt a 
“‘protective model’ limiting the impact of forum selection clauses 
in consumer contracts.”319  If the dissenting opinion is correct in its 
finding that no consumer exception exists under the Canadian 
Privacy Act, then the court arguably should have minimally 
interpreted the scope of the clause.  However, given that Canadian 
courts focus more on enforcement related tests and rarely apply 
foreign law directly, it is unsurprising that such an analysis was not 
included in the opinion. 
3. United States 
a. Summary of Relevant Law 
Procedurally speaking, U.S. courts often address the 
interpretation of a forum selection clause when one party seeks to 
dismiss the case based on a forum selection clause in an 
agreement.320  The threshold question for the court in such cases is 
 
adduce any evidence of California law or California procedure related to either private 
international law or the adjudication of privacy claims.  She did not provide evidence of 
California law related to territorial jurisdiction.”  Id. at ¶ 166. 
 318 Id. at ¶ 124. 
 319 Id. at ¶¶ 143–44.  The court compared this to the Code of Quebec, for example, 
which had such a clear provision.  Id. at ¶ 143.  The court stated, “[i]f the legislature had 
intended to render forum selection clauses inoperable for claims made under the Privacy 
Act, it would have said so expressly.”  Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33, supra note 
311 at ¶ 144. 
 320 A motion to dismiss is not the only procedural possibility for attempting to enforce 
a forum selection clause in the United States.  In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held a 
forum selection clause can be found to be enforceable through a motion to transfer venue 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which states “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, 
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district 
or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all 
parties have consented.”  Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of 
Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 59, 134 S. Ct. 568, 579 (2013).  This procedure would, however, be 
limited to transfers between federal courts in the United States and would not be applicable 
in international cases or in cases where a forum selection clause or a party aim to transfer 
the case to a state court.  See id. at 59–60, 579-–80.  However, dismissal proceedings are 
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to decide whether to enforce the forum selection clause and dismiss 
the case.321  In deciding whether to enforce a forum selection clause, 
U.S. courts typically structure the discussion around the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens, which allows the court to dismiss a case if 
the forum is inconvenient or another forum is better suited to hear 
the case.322  The party seeking dismissal under the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens must establish “the existence of an adequate 
alternative forum.”323  At the same time, a court is required to give 
some deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, with respect to 
the general rule that “a plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be 
disturbed.”324  Under a traditional forum non conveniens analysis, a 
court must balance the relevant public and private interest factors, 
which are typically considered along with other arguments, such as 
considering the public policy of the forum or general interests of 
justice.325 
 
still the primary avenue to address such issues in U.S. courts.  As one U.S. district court 
put it, “[w]hen the most appropriate forum is abroad, ‘no mechanism provides for transfer 
between the courts of different sovereigns’ and, therefore, ‘dismissal under forum non 
conveniens remains the appropriate remedy.’’’  My Size, Inc. v. Mizrahi, 193 F.Supp.3d 
327, 331 (D. Del. 2016). 
 321 The court may also phrase this question by asking whether the forum selection 
clause is “valid” and/or “enforceable.” 
 322 For more on the general doctrine forum non conveniens, see generally Edward L. 
Barrett Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380 (1947). 
 323 Mizrahi, 193 F.Supp.3d at 331. 
 324 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241, 102 S.Ct. 252, 258 (1981).  This 
rule is based on the idea that a plaintiff should generally be able to litigate in their home 
forum, which is ideally the most convenient forum for that plaintiff.  However, as the Piper 
Aircraft case also noted, the rule has its limits.  If a foreign plaintiff is seeking to litigate 
outside its home forum, the foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum may be given less deference 
and considered to be forum shopping instead.  Id. at 256.  “Forum shopping” is a term used 
to describe individuals who seek to litigate in a certain forum for strategical reasons.  For 
more on forum shopping, see generally Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum 
Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011); Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 333 (2006). 
 325 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 235, 102 S. Ct. at 258.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
outlined relevant public and private interest factors that should be considered in a forum 
non conveniens analysis in the Piper Aircraft case.  The private interest factors often 
include: (1) relative ease of access to evidence or sources of proof; (2) availability of a 
process to compel a party or individual to appear; (3) cost of obtaining the attendance of 
an unwilling party; (4) possibility of viewing relevant premises or locations that may be 
appropriate to the action; and (5) all other practical problems that make a trial easy, 
expeditious, and inexpensive.  Id.  The public interest factors often include: (1) 
administrative difficulties flowing from case congestion in the court; (2) the cost to the 
court system of resolving litigation unrelated to a particular forum; (3) the “local interest 
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Historically, courts in the United States were weary of enforcing 
forum selection clauses, as such clauses were perceived as a 
mechanism to prevent an otherwise proper court from hearing a 
dispute or to be against public policy.326  The turning point came in 
1972 when the United States Supreme Court decided the admiralty 
case M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.327  In M/S Bremen, the 
Supreme Court held, for the first time, that forum selection clauses 
are by default valid and enforceable.328  More specifically, the Court 
held that analyses of forum selection clauses under the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens require a court to modify the doctrine by 
adding a presumption that forum selection clauses are “prima facie 
valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the 
resisting party to be unreasonable under the circumstances.”329 
The Supreme Court’s holding that forum selection clauses are 
presumptively valid and enforceable has been upheld and applied in 
several cases since 1972.330  Under current U.S. case law, forum 
 
in having localized controversies decided at home;” (4) the interest in having a case in a 
forum that is at home with the law which must govern the action; and (5) “the avoidance 
of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign laws.”  Id.   
Courts sometimes add to or modify both the public and private interest factors to better 
suit a particular case.  See also Bos. Telecomms. Grp., Inc. v. Wood, 588 F.3d 1201, 1211 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
 326 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1913 (1972) 
[hereinafter The Bremen]. 
 327 Id. at 1, 92 S. Ct. at 1909. 
 328 Id. at 15, 92 S. Ct. at 1916. 
 329 Id. at 10, 92 S. Ct. at 1913.  Under the Bremen case, forum selection clauses should 
be found unenforceable only when (1) their formation was induced by fraud or 
overreaching; (2) the plaintiff effectively would be deprived of its day in court because of 
the inconvenience or unfairness of the chosen forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of the 
chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) enforcement of such provisions 
would contravene a strong public policy.  Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 
F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15–18). 
 330 Such cases include the Supreme Court case Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 
499 U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) and Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for 
W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).  In the 2013 Atlantic Marine case, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts conducting a forum non conveniens analysis where 
the parties have agreed to a forum selection clause “should not consider arguments about 
the parties’ private interests” because, by agreeing to a forum selection clause, parties 
“waive the right to challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for 
themselves or their witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation.”  571 U.S. at 64, 134 S. 
Ct. at 582.  A court performing a forum non conveniens analysis should therefore only 
consider the public interest factors.  Id.  “Because [public-interest factors] will rarely defeat 
a transfer motion, the practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control except 
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selection clauses should be enforced in all but the most exceptional 
cases.  However, while the Supreme Court has tackled many of the 
enforceability issues, no real guidance has been given by the Court 
with regard to the interpretation of forum selection clauses.  
Consequently, case examples are particularly important for 
determining how U.S. courts treat interpretation issues.  The case 
examples provided below demonstrate that the various U.S. federal 
circuit courts approach the issue quite differently, resulting in no 
settled U.S. law on the interpretation of forum selection clauses. 
b. Case Examples331 
How a court in the United States will interpret a forum selection 
clause highly depends on which circuit the court interpreting the 
clause is situated in.  Many courts still limit discussion of forum 
selection clauses to an enforceability analysis and do not even 
attempt to interpret the wording or meaning of a forum selection 
clause, often citing to general conflict of law rules instead.  Other 
courts recognize the interpretation of forum selection clauses as an 
issue separate from enforceability issues.  However, as discussed 
below, there is a circuit split as to what law governs these 
interpretation issues in international contracts that designate foreign 
law in their choice-of-law clause.332 
 
in unusual cases.”  Id. 
 331 Research on U.S. cases was primarily conducted using Westlaw and Lexis Nexis. 
 332 With regard to forum selection clauses, the Ninth Circuit has held that “U.S. 
federal common law” applies to interpretation issues.  Connex R.R. LLC v. AXA Corp. 
Sols. Assurance, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2016).  By contrast, the Second and 
Tenth Circuits have held that the law chosen by the parties in a valid choice-of-law clause 
applies to interpret forum selection clauses.  Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211 (2d 
Cir. 2014); Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006).  However, where the 
parties did not brief the applicable foreign law, the second circuit has indicated it may 
“apply federal precedent and general contract law as necessary to interpret the meaning 
and scope of the forum selection clause.”  Donnay USA Ltd. v. Donnay Int’l S.A., 705 F. 
App’x 21 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 386 (2d 
Cir. 2007)).  As noted in the Martinez case, other circuit courts, while not articulating it so 
clearly, have also applied the law chosen by the parties in a choice-of-law clause to the 
interpretation of a forum selection clause.  See Abbott Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 
F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying the chosen Illinois law); see also Albemarle Corp. 
v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 628 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying English law to hold 
the forum selection clause was mandatory and exclusive).  The Fifth Circuit has taken a 
different path, holding the choice-of-law rules of the forum apply to ascertain which body 
of substantive law applies to determining the meaning of a forum selection clause 
regardless of the presence or absence of a choice-of-law clause.  See Weber v. PACT XPP 
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After discussing a case example from the Ninth Circuit which 
illustrates a court’s application of “U.S. federal common law” to 
interpretation issues, this paper will turn to focus on cases where 
courts decided that the foreign law chosen by the parties in a valid 
choice-of-law clause should apply to interpret a forum selection 
clause.  These cases demonstrate further discrepancies even 
between courts that agree on what law applies.333  Specifically, even 
if a court has engaged in the discussion of which law applies to the 
interpretation of a forum selection clause, or perhaps even decided, 
whether implicitly or explicitly, that foreign law governs the 
interpretation, such courts do not always actually apply foreign law 
in their interpretation analysis.334  Following the Ninth Circuit case 
 
Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding Texas law applied to determine 
whether Texas or German substantive law applied to interpret a forum selection clause 
selecting German courts).  The Eleventh Circuit has held “general contract principles” 
govern the interpretation of a forum selection clause.  Slater v. Energy Servs. Grp. Int’l, 
Inc., 634 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2011).  Finally, in at least one recent case before the 
D.C. Circuit, the court has applied “guiding principles” to interpret the scope of a forum 
selection clause.  See Glycobiosciences, Inc. v. Innocutis Holdings, LLC, 189 F. Supp. 3d 
61, 68 (D. D.C. 2016) (applying three guiding principles to decide whether claims “‘arise’ 
from a contract”). 
 333 Thinking back to what can be thought of as the three steps of analysis discussed in 
the introduction of the paper—namely: (1) enforceability analysis; (2) discussion of which 
law governs the interpretation of the clause; and (3) actual interpretation of the clause— 
this means that U.S. courts can disagree at any of these three steps.  As mentioned 
previously, U.S. courts may focus on enforcement issues and not engage in what is 
suggested by this paper to be step two or three of the analysis.  Moreover, even if a U.S. 
court engages in step two and discusses what law applies, that does not mean the court will 
engage in step three.  Further, whereas a U.S. court is more likely to agree on their holdings 
under step one of the analysis due to the previously discussed binding precedent from the 
U.S. Supreme Court on the enforcement of forum selection clauses, there is no indication 
that U.S. courts will always agree in their holdings under step two or step three regarding 
the interpretation of a forum selection clause. 
 334 Given U.S. courts are scattered across the board with regard to how they handle 
the interpretation of forum selection clauses, each and every approach that courts take to 
this issue cannot be fully exemplified in this paper.  A review of case law from several 
jurisdictions suggests that even courts which agree on what law applies often fall into one 
of the following categories on this issue: (1) the court states the chosen foreign law should 
be applied but then does not discuss the interpretive questions at all and simply skips to 
enforceability issues and dismisses on forum non conveniens grounds; (2) the court states 
the chosen foreign law applies to interpretation issues but limits the application of foreign 
law—often due to the parties not discussing the foreign law in briefing or because the 
experts disagree—and decides the case on other grounds; (3) the court states the chosen 
foreign law should be applied to interpretation issues but then cites and discusses only U.S. 
cases in discussing interpretation issues and thus does not really “apply” the foreign law; 
or (4) the court states the chosen foreign law should be applied to interpretation issues and 
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example, three examples are provided to highlight some of the main 
trends and differing approaches.  These include a pivotal Second 
Circuit case and two District Court cases which demonstrate 
different paths taken by courts that agree the foreign law chosen by 
the parties in a valid choice-of-law clause should apply to interpret 
a forum selection clause. 
Unlike any other circuit, courts in the Ninth Circuit consistently 
hold that “U.S. federal common law” applies to interpret forum 
selection clauses in international contracts.  In Connex R.R. LLC v. 
AXA Corp. Sols. Assurance, a 2016 case heard in a California 
District Court, the plaintiffs were operators of a commuter train.  In 
2008, the train had an accident in California which resulted in 
injuries to several individuals who later sued the plaintiffs in 
personal injury suits.335  The defendant was an insurer of excess 
coverage insurance for plaintiffs’ parent company.336  The plaintiffs 
filed a claim alleging the defendant fraudulently induced them to 
 
then cites foreign authority or an expert in foreign law.  For a case in the first category, see 
My Size, Inc. v. Mizrahi, 193 F. Supp. 3d 327 (D. Del. 2016) (deciding to simply dismiss 
on forum non conveniens grounds due to differing opinions on the translation of the forum 
selection clause). For cases in the second category, see F5 Capital v. RBS Sec. Inc., No. 
3:14-CV-1469 (VLB), 2015 WL 5797019 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2015) (applying “general 
contract law principles and federal precedent” under the Phillips case instead of English 
law because the parties did not cite to English law in their arguments); see also Ujvari v. 
1stdibs.com, Inc., No. 16 CIV. 2216 (PGG), 2017 WL 4082309, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 
2017) (discussing several interpretation issues related to a forum selection clause but 
limiting the application of the chosen English law to the interpretation of the scope of the 
clause with regard to claims because the parties relied on English law only related to this 
specific interpretive issue).  For a case in the third category, see Giordano v. UBS, AG, 
134 F. Supp. 3d 697, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating Swiss law applied to interpret the forum 
selection clause but citing only to U.S. cases for interpretive issues, and only discussing 
Swiss law as it pertains to whether a Swiss court would accept jurisdiction).  For cases in 
the fourth category, see Laspata DeCaro Studio Corp. v. Rimowa GmbH, No. 16 CIV. 934 
(LGS), 2017 WL 1906863 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017) (citing to opinions of German experts 
to decide whether a forum selection clause was exclusive and whether crossclaims were 
included within the scope of the clause); see also MBC Fin. Servs. Ltd. v. Boston Merch. 
Fin., Ltd., No. 15-CV-00275 (DAB), 2016 WL 5946709 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2016), aff’d, 
704 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing English and British Virgin Island case law to 
interpret whether claims fell within the scope of the forum selection clause); see also DBS 
Sols. LLC v. Infovista Corp., No. 3:15-CV-03875-M, 2016 WL 3926505 (N.D. Tex. July 
21, 2016) (citing to secondary sources on French law to interpret whether the dispute fell 
within the scope of the forum selection clause). 
 335 Connex R.R. LLC, 209 F. Supp. at 1149. 
 336 Id.  The defendants in the case included the insurance company and ten other 
defendants, Defendant Does 1-10, who were not discussed in the opinion and therefore 
will not be discussed in the case summary provided in this paper. 
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settle the personal injury suits by making false statements.337  The 
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case under the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens based on a forum selection clause in the 
insurance policy between plaintiffs’ parent company and the 
defendant.  The policy, written in French and issued in France, 
contained a choice-of-law clause and a forum selection clause 
pointing to French law and courts.338  The parties disputed whether 
the clause applied to the plaintiffs, who were similarly situated 
parties but non-signatories to the agreement.339  The court decided 
to apply U.S. federal common law to interpret the forum selection 
clause and explicitly declined to apply French law.340  The decision 
to apply federal common law to the case was outcome determinative 
in the motion to dismiss stage of litigation, and led the court to deny 
dismissing the case on forum non conveniens grounds.  Instead, the 
Connex Court held “the public interest factors and the overall 
circumstances of the case strongly favor litigation in [California] 
rather than in France.”341 
By contrast, the Second Circuit—perhaps for the first time for 
any U.S. court—clearly distinguished the issues of enforcement and 
interpretation of a forum selection clause in Martinez v. Bloomberg 
LP.342  In Martinez, that court employed a four-part analysis to 
review a district court’s decision to dismiss a claim based on a 
 
 337 Id.  The alleged false statements included the defendant telling plaintiffs that it 
would negotiate with the insurers of the injured individuals and would arbitrate the cases 
if necessary. 
 338 Id.  The exact translation of the forum selection clause and choice-of law-clause 
was disputed among the parties.  Id.  In its opinion, the District Court stated the clause 
requires “certain disputes arising therefrom to be litigated in France.”  Id.  (emphasis 
added).  The defendant AXA, in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss the Action for Forum Non Conveniens, provided the French text of the 
clause in a footnote, and claimed the translated clause read: “Any dispute between the 
Insured and the Insurer arising from the interpretation of the clauses and conditions of the 
contract will be subject only to French Law and will be under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the French Courts, even if a dispute concerns an insured domiciled or headquartered 
outside of France.”  Defendant AXA Corp. Sols. Assurance’s Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss II(A) ¶ 3 (emphasis added). 
 339 Connex R.R. LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1150. 
 340 In doing so, the court stated: “[A]t least one district court has interpreted Ninth 
Circuit precedent to mean that district courts sitting in diversity ‘must interpret forum-
selection clauses under federal common law, without regard to any choice-of-law 
provisions in the subject agreement.’  This Court agrees.”  Id. 
 341 Id. at 1149, 1151. 
 342 Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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forum selection clause.343  The first part of the analysis was a 
question of fact and asked whether the forum selection clause was 
“reasonably communicated to the party resisting enforcement.”344  
The second and third parts of the analysis, the “interpretive 
questions,” determine whether the forum selection clause is 
mandatory or permissive, and whether the claims and parties 
involved in the suit are subject to the forum selection clause.345  
Under these first three parts, “[i]f the forum clause was 
communicated to the resisting party, has mandatory force and 
covers the claims and parties involved in the dispute, it is 
presumptively enforceable.”346  The fourth part of the analysis looks 
more similar to the typical forum non conveniens analysis.347 
In deciding the three questions of law in the four-part analysis, 
the Martinez court recognized that courts must know what law to 
apply to these questions of law.  The court held that U.S. federal law 
should apply to the fourth part of the analysis “[t]o ensure that 
federal courts account for both the important interests served by 
forum selection clauses and the strong public policies that might 
require federal courts to override such clauses.”348  However, to 
answer the interpretive questions posed by the second and third 
parts of the analysis, the court clearly stated the body of law selected 
by the parties in an otherwise valid choice-of-law clause should be 
applied.349 
The issue in dispute in Martinez was whether the plaintiff’s 
discrimination claims fit within the scope of the forum selection 
clause which applied to disputes “arising under” the plaintiff’s 
 
 343 Id. at 217. 
 344 Id. (quoting Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 345 Id.  The question of whether a forum selection clause is “mandatory or permissive” 
is effectively the same as the question of whether or not a forum selection clause is 
“exclusive.” 
 346 Id. 
 347 Under the fourth part of the analysis, pursuant to the Bremen decision, a party can 
overcome the presumption of enforceability of a forum selection clause by “making a 
sufficiently strong showing that enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, or that the 
clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”  Id. at 217. 
 348 Martinez, 740 F.3d at 220. 
 349 Id. at 218.  In its decision, the court reiterated, “[h]ence, if we are called upon to 
determine whether a particular forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive, or 
whether its scope encompasses the claims or parties involved in a certain suit, we apply 
the law contractually selected by the parties.”  Id. 
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employment contract.350  The court turned to the law chosen by the 
parties to govern the employment contract, English law, to answer 
the interpretive question.351  Not only did both parties in the case 
cite to English case law in their arguments, but the court discussed 
English case law on what seemed to be its own initiative at length.352  
The court held under English law the phrase “arising under” “should 
be construed to encompass a claim for discrimination based on 
perceived disability.”353  After answering this interpretative question 
and finding the forum selection clause was mandatory and 
reasonably communicated, the court turned to an enforceability 
analysis under U.S. federal law and the four-part Bremen test, 
ultimately affirming the district court’s decision to dismiss the 
case.354 
As discussed above, even when U.S. courts decide foreign law 
chosen by the parties in a choice-of-law clause applies to 
interpreting a forum selection clause, such as the Second Circuit did 
in Martinez, courts take various paths to their desired disposition.  
The two case examples below demonstrate common issues that 
occur in such cases and two of many pathways courts may take.355 
In My Size, Inc. v. Mizrahi, a 2016 federal case from Delaware, 
the contract in dispute between the parties contained forum 
selection and choice-of-law clauses.  In addition, the contract was 
negotiated and executed in Israel and written in Hebrew.356  The 
plaintiff alleged the translated forum selection clause read “[t]he 
law which applies to this agreement is the law of the State of Israel 
and the place of jurisdiction for the purpose of a jurisdiction clause 
is the courts of the district of Tel Aviv-Jaffa.”357  The defendants 
 
 350 Id. at 224. 
 351 Id. 
 352 Id. 
 353 Martinez, 740 F.3d at 224. 
 354 Id. at 227–28, 230. 
 355 For examples of cases that took different approaches, see supra note 334. 
 356 The plaintiff was a Delaware corporation whose stock was exclusively sold on the 
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in Israel.  The defendants included individuals and companies 
who bought and traded shares of plaintiff’s stock, plaintiff’s former director, a corporation 
incorporated in Israel, and individuals residing in Israel.  The dispute between the parties 
resulted from stock purchases, stock trading transactions, and related investment decisions 
by and between the parties related to the plaintiff’s stock.  My Size, Inc v. Mizrahi, 193 F. 
Supp. 3d 327, 329–30 (D. Del. 2016). 
 357 Id. 
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alleged the clause translated to read, “[t]he law that shall govern 
this agreement is the law of the State of Israel and the place of 
jurisdiction for the purpose of a jurisdiction clause is the courts of 
the district of Tel Aviv-Jaffa District.”358  Although the court held 
Israeli law governed the interpretation of the forum selection clause, 
disagreement among experts on each side of the case as to whether 
the forum selection clause was mandatory or permissive under 
Israeli law led the court to decline to make a determination on the 
interpretation issues.  Instead, it dismissed the case under the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, finding that, based on the private 
and public interest factors from the Piper Aircraft case, Israel was 
the more appropriate forum.359  The court declined “to make a 
determination on the merits of the forum selection clause” because 
“the doctrine of forum non conveniens require[d] the case to be 
dismissed.”360 
In another case, Sberbank of Russia v. Traisman, a district court 
in Connecticut was also called upon to address the interpretation 
and enforceability of a forum selection clause.361  The plaintiff in 
the case was a Russian commercial bank and the defendant was the 
alleged owner of a Russian company, Sealand LLC (“Sealand”).362  
The defendant executed three personal guaranty agreements in favor 
of the plaintiff to secure commercial loans provided to Sealand by 
the plaintiff.363  The forum selection clause in the guaranties 
indicated disputes were subject to “adjudication in the procedure of 
 
 358 Id. 
 359 Id. at 333–36.  The experts on both sides of the case were lawyers in Israel.  In 
dismissing the case, the court stated: 
 
The Third Circuit has held that applying foreign law is not by itself grounds for 
dismissal.  However, in a case where there is “such oppression and vexation of a 
defendant as to be out of all proportion to the plaintiff’s convenience,” transfer 
for forum non conveniens is appropriate.  Here, the burden of litigating in 
Delaware (including requiring experts or translators to interpret Israeli law) 
disproportionately burdens defendants.   
 
Id. at 335–36. 
 360 Id. at 334. 
 361 Sberbank of Russ. v. Traisman, No. 3:14cv216 (WWE), 2014 WL 10999674 (D. 
Conn. Dec. 14, 2014). 
 362 Id. at *1. 
 363 Id. 
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the established legislation of the Russian Federation.”364  Two of the 
guaranties stated the agreements were “governed by the laws of the 
Russian Federation.”365  Citing to the Second Circuit Martinez 
decision, the Traisman Court held Russian law applied to 
interpreting the meaning and scope of the forum selection clause.366  
Both parties submitted expert opinions.367  The court credited the 
opinion of the plaintiff’s expert because the defendant’s expert did 
not cite to any Russian legal authority to support his opinion that a 
non-signatory could enforce a forum selection clause, and found 
there was no enforceable exclusive forum selection clause.368  While 
the interpretative analysis conducted by the Traisman court was 
more thorough than that given by the Mizrahi court, which 
explicitly declined to decide based on the applicable foreign law, its 
analysis did not seem to add much weight to the court’s decision.  
The Traisman court’s decision to ultimately deny the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss was based on a three-part analysis determining: 
(1) “what deference is owed [to the] plaintiff’s choice of forum;” 
(2) “whether the alternative forum proposed by the defendants is 
adequate to adjudicate the parties’ dispute;” and (3) assessing the 
case under relevant public and private interest factors.369  Hence, 
unlike in the Mizrahi case, but using similar tools and a similar path, 
the court denied the dismissal. 
The above case examples and the U.S. case law discussed in the 
previous section regarding enforcement issues encompass the 
current U.S. law governing the enforcement and interpretation of 
 
 364 Id. 
 365 Id. 
 366 Id. at *2. 
 367 Sberbank of Russ., No. 3:14cv216 (WWE), 2014 WL 10999674 at *3.  The 
defendant’s expert was a Russian lawyer and the plaintiff’s expert was a professor of law 
at a Russian University.  Id.  According to the plaintiff’s expert, Russian courts require a 
“high threshold of definiteness for a clause to be recognized as a valid and enforceable 
choice-of-court agreement” and the name of the court must be explicitly stated for the 
clause to be exclusive.  Id.  To dispute the opinion of the plaintiff’s expert, the defendant 
pointed to a forum selection clause in the credit agreements between Sealand and the 
plaintiff, which specifically stated the Commercial Court of the City of Moscow had 
jurisdiction, and the defendant’s expert opined the defendant would be considered to be 
“closely related” to Sealand, allowing the forum selection clause of the credit agreements 
to be enforced despite the plaintiff being a non-signatory.  Id. 
 368 Id. 
 369 Id. at *2 (citing the public and private interest factors applied in Iragorri v. United 
Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71–73 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
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forum selection clauses.  As these cases demonstrate, U.S. law 
governing this issue is patchwork and rather inconsistent, at best. 
IV. Conclusion 
When a party seeks to enforce a forum selection clause in a 
court, the court has to decide more than whether or not to enforce 
the forum selection clause; they also have to decide what that forum 
selection clause means, which requires interpretation of the clause.  
For example, the court may have to decide whether the forum 
selection clause is exclusive, whether it applies in scope to the 
claim(s) before the court, or whether the clause applies to third 
parties who are not part of the agreement containing the clause.  
These interpretative questions are questions of law and therefore 
must be answered according to the law of some jurisdiction, but 
which one?  Put simply, in interpreting forum selection clauses, 
whose law is the court applying?  This paper has attempted to 
answer this question for several of the major English- and German-
speaking jurisdictions.  By comparing the approach on the 
enforcement and interpretation of forum selection clauses in 
Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, 
Canada, and the United States, this paper has highlighted divisions 
between and among civil law and common law jurisdictions, and 
between and among Member States of the European Union and 
countries not a part of the EU. 
The survey results presented in this paper present several 
overlapping approaches that the jurisdictions discussed in this 
paper, at least, are applying to the enforcement and interpretation of 
forum selection clauses.  The table below illustrates these 









 370 There is, of course, room for argument as to whether or not some of these 
approaches are applied in each country or sovereign state.  The table is solely based on an 
overall analysis from the author of this paper using the relevant case law and case examples 
discussed in this paper. 





Private international law or 
conflict of law rules are 
imbedded in national law 
(whether statutory or case 
law) 
 
Germany, United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada, United States 
Has a separate statute 
specifically related to private 
international law or conflict 
of law rules 
Austria, Switzerland 
Private international law 
rules include Lis Pendens 
rules 
Germany, Austria, United 
Kingdom, Switzerland 
Includes a presumption of 
enforceability for forum 
selection clauses  
Germany, Austria, United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, 
Australia, Canada, United States 
Includes a presumption of 
exclusivity for forum 
selection clauses 
Germany, Austria, United 
Kingdom (per EU law), 
Switzerland 
Primarily discusses foreign 
law from a choice-of-law 
clause without relying on 
alternative support 
Switzerland, United States 
(some circuits, arguably) 
Discusses foreign law from a 
choice-of-law clause only in 
the context of back-up or 
alternative support 
Germany, Austria (somewhat) 
Applies basic contract 
principles to interpret a 
forum selection clause 
United States (some circuits) 
Requires a court to 
determine the content of 
foreign law ex officio 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland 
Requires a court to apply the 
content of foreign law ex 
officio 
Austria, Switzerland 
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Specifies which law applies 
if the court is unable to 
determine the content of 
foreign law 
Austria, Switzerland 
Relies mostly on expert 
opinions on foreign law 
England, United States (some 
circuits), Germany 
Likely to directly cite to 
foreign law 
Switzerland 
Applies a “difference in law” 
test 
United Kingdom 
Relies mostly on common 
law tests to interpret forum 
selection clauses 
United States (some circuits), 
Australia, Canada 
 
As exhibited by the table above, there is no one clear approach 
to the enforcement and interpretation of forum selection clauses 
among the countries and sovereign states surveyed.  There are clear 
differences between civil law jurisdictions with specific private 
international law statutes and rules which procedurally specify how 
courts should handle forum selection clauses, and common law 
courts around the world which apply various and sometimes 
unpredictable tests.  Despite these major divisions, the table above 
also demonstrates common ground among the smaller aspects of 
each country or sovereign state’s approach to forum selection 
clauses.  Wherever each jurisdiction surveyed falls within these 
approaches, this survey has certainly demonstrated that none of the 
jurisdictions share the exact same approach and the enforcement 
and interpretation of jurisdiction clauses is therefore uniquely 
approached in English- and German-speaking countries. 
 
